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Aging and Strategic Learning: The Impact of Spousal Incentives on Financial Literacy

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Abstract: In the U.S., women tend to have lower levels of financial literacy than men. This is consistent with a household division of labor in which men manage finances. However, women also tend to outlive their husbands, so they will eventually need to take over this task. Using a new survey of older couples, I find that women acquire additional financial literacy as they approach widowhood. At an estimated increase of 0.04 standard deviations per year approaching widowhood, 80% of women in my sample would catch up with their husbands prior to the expected onset of widowhood. I also demonstrate that these findings are due to actual increases by women and are not merely an artifact of cognitive decline among older men. These results are consistent with a model in which the household division of labor breaks down when a spouse dies. The model shows that women have an incentive both to delay acquiring financial knowledge and also to begin learning before widowhood. This paper represents the first empirical examination of the financial literacy of both members of couples and provides a life-cycle interpretation of the gender gap in financial literacy.

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1 Introduction

Empirical studies have found that women tend to have, on average, lower levels of financial literacy than men (Fonseca et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001). This gap may reflect a division of labor within the household such that men are responsible for financial matters. However, women also tend to outlive their husbands, so they will eventually need to take over this task. Women therefore have an incentive both to delay acquiring financial knowledge and also to begin learning prior to widowhood. Financial literacy is a critical form of financial knowledge that is linked to important economic outcomes. Economists view investment in human capital as a purposive process, and in this paper, I show that the acquisition of financial literacy is no different.

This paper presents a model of the human capital investment process of longer-lived spouses over the life cycle and tests the model's predictions using innovative new data on financial literacy and financial decision-making. The management of household finances is likely to both be subject to a division of labor and to be taken care of by men, who will most likely be survived by their wives. I show that the prospect of widowhood provides an incentive for women to accumulate financial literacy. In particular, the model generates three results. First, if the household finances are managed by their husbands, women may rationally delay learning about finances. Secondly, investments in financial knowledge should increase as widowhood becomes more imminent; lastly, longer durations of widowhood provide additional incentives for accumulating more human capital.

While I analyze the model specifically for women and financial literacy, the model is generalizable to any task specialized in by the shorter living spouse. Using a cross-sectional sample that links husbands and wives, I use variation in the husbands' life expectancies to analyze how women accumulate human capital relative to their husbands (who do not have this incentive to increase learning in old age) as women approach widowhood. I find

that women increase their financial literacy as they approach widowhood. At an estimated increase of 0.04 standard deviations per year approaching widowhood, 80 percent of women in my sample would catch up with their husbands prior to the expected onset of widowhood.

Financial knowledge is critical due to its relationship to economic outcomes and its policy implications. Financial literacy is linked to financial decision-making and outcomes, including more effective wealth management (Hilgert et al., 2003), better management of credit and debt (Hilgert et al., 2003; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009), retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2009), increased saving (Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001; Carlin and Robinson, 2010), and higher stock market participation (Delavande et al., 2008; van Rooij et al., 2007). Given these links, having sufficient financial literacy is becoming even more important since the responsibility for retirement planning has shifted to individuals. Wealth management has become increasingly complex as predictable streams of retirement income from defined benefit pensions have been replaced by defined contribution plans that need to be managed both before and after retirement (Mitchell and Schieber, 1998). In addition, financial literacy has become a prominent policy issue. While the government identified increasing financial literacy as a policy goal in 2003 (Fair and Accurate Transaction Act), this goal has become an even higher priority in the wake of the 2008 economic crisis. The large numbers of foreclosures, defaults, and debt problems that arose during the housing and financial crisis highlight the costs of financial illiteracy for individuals with low and high levels of wealth. Furthermore, policy proposals to privatize Social Security would introduce further individual responsibility for retirement planning and require even more knowledge.

This paper makes a number of contributions. This is, to my knowledge, the first study to analyze investments in financial knowledge in a life-cycle framework. While a number of studies have shown that women have lower levels of financial literacy than men, I show that women accumulate knowledge as they approach widowhood, suggesting that a gender gap in financial literacy may reflect strategic responses of women to incentives over the life cycle.

Second, my paper is the first to link the financial knowledge of the two members of a couple. By using the *spousal* gap in financial literacy rather than differences between women and men in different households, I can investigate how financial knowledge relates to the division of labor over the life cycle. I also use a detailed set of cognitive measures to show that the narrowing of the wife-husband gap in financial knowledge reflects advances on the part of women and are not merely an artifact of their husband's cognitive decline.

This paper combines ideas about the household division of labor with human capital theory. Section 2 provides additional background on financial knowledge as human capital in the context of the household division of labor and widowhood. Section 3 presents a theoretical model of the timing of a woman's investment in financial human capital over her lifetime. Section 4 describes the data used, and Section 5 presents evidence that older women acquire financial knowledge as widowhood approaches. These effects remain even when controlling for the cognitive decline of the husband. Section 6 concludes.

2 Financial literacy, human capital, and specialization

The management of household finances is an important type of non-market production that requires its own form of human capital. One major component of this human capital is financial literacy. There is increasing public and scholarly interest in financial literacy and informed financial decision-making, in part because of the poor financial outcomes that are associated with low levels of financial literacy: problems with debt (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009) and lack of retirement planning (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2009), among others. At the same time, studies have found that Americans tend to display low levels of financial literacy (Bernheim, 1998; Hilgert et al., 2003; Lusardi and Tufano, 2009). In particular, Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) find that financial illiteracy is widespread among older Americans. Recent government policies, including the establishment of the Consumer

Financial Protection Bureau, aim to increase financial literacy among the public.

Studies have shown that women tend to have lower levels of financial literacy than men (Fonseca et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001). This is true even for younger women (Lusardi et al., 2009a; Chen and Volpe, 2002), in spite of the gains in educational attainment younger women have made relative to men. Low levels of financial literacy may not be problematic if one's partner has higher literacy and specializes in managing household finances. As Becker (1985) shows, under a number of assumptions, it is efficient for members of a household to specialize in particular tasks. However, such reliance on a partner can have serious consequences when one is unable to divide tasks among household members either before the formation of a household or during widowhood.

In American households, men are usually primarily responsible for household finances.¹ In the Cognitive Economics Study used in this paper, only 16 percent of couples report that the woman is the most financially knowledgeable person in the household. A person may become the financial specialist in a couple for a number of reasons. First, the person with a greater stock of financial knowledge when entering the marriage might be more likely to specialize; this could favor the older member of the couple, typically the man. This advantage may arise from past experience with money and finances, possibly through one's occupation. Educational sorting may play a role, if college-educated women were more likely to major in non-quantitative fields. Second, in addition to the initial stock of knowledge however acquired, another factor may simply be interest or enthusiasm on the part of the specialist, or fear or avoidance on the part of the non-specialist. Third, the division of labor may also be a product of intra-household bargaining, in which the spouse with more power becomes

¹Another form of non-market production is the management of health and medical matters. In the United States, women tend to specialize in these matters. Studies show between 60 to 80 percent of women are primary decision makers about health care (including selecting doctors and health insurance) for their families, with an additional 18 to 22 percent reporting making joint decisions with partners or spouses (Salganicoff et al., 2002, 2005). Critically, however, men are much less likely to outlive a spouse and be tasked with replicating this knowledge.

the financial specialist. Whatever the root causes, women tend to be less financially literate than men. Since women are likely to outlive men, this leads again to the question of what happens when this division of labor is no longer sustainable.

Indeed, some economists have shown that the expected duration of a household affects how labor is divided. Johnson and Skinner (1986) find that greater divorce risk increases the labor supply of women, and Stratton (2005) shows that cohabitating couples, whose relationships are typically shorter in duration than those of married couples, have less intra-household specialization in housework than married couples. While widowhood is a completely different form of relationship termination, it operates similarly by ending a person's ability to reap the benefits of specialization. This suggests that the nature of the division of labor within a household changes over time and therefore calls for continued investment.

Widowhood is a very likely outcome for most married women, who not only face longer life expectancies than men but are also typically younger than their husbands. According to 1995 marital status life tables, 75 percent of marriages not ending in divorce end in widowhood (Schoen and Standish, 2001). Furthermore, the mean duration of widowhood in the Health and Retirement Study is about nine years (author's own calculations). Although the gender disparity in life expectancies has changed over time, widowed women still outnumbered widowed men four to one in 2003 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004). The prospect of many years without the couple's financial specialist creates incentives for women to prepare by acquiring financial knowledge.

The notion that financial knowledge is a form of human capital was introduced in Delavande et al. (2008), which related the production of human capital to portfolio choice. Human capital accumulation is purposive based on its costs and benefits, and likewise, financial illiteracy or lack of financial knowledge can be costly for widows for a number of reasons. Even a widow who plans to delegate the management of her finances to a professional

or a relative needs enough knowledge to choose someone trustworthy and to recognize if she is being bilked. If she manages her own finances, she needs to be knowledgeable enough to distinguish fraudulent offers from legitimate ones. On the other hand, a widow who recognizes her lack of knowledge but does not trust any individuals or financial institutions may lose potential gains by keeping all of her money in cash. Lack of financial knowledge can also lead to anxiety about money. A woman with insufficient financial knowledge may find herself in widowhood without a firm understanding of how much she can afford to spend, what her holdings are, or how quickly to decumulate during widowhood.

Since investment decisions and payoffs are realized over the life cycle, an important aspect of human capital accumulation is the timing of such investments. Mincer and Polachek (1974) argue that the human capital investments and time allocation of individuals will be influenced by expectations of future family and market activities. In most applications such as formal education and on the job training (Ben-Porath, 1967), it is advantageous to invest early to capture the longest stream of benefits. On the other hand, some investments (such as religious devotion as investment in the afterlife, studied by Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975)) do not yield benefits until much later in life, so that the payoffs to such investments should increase with age. Similarly, household specialization creates delays in the returns to investing in knowledge related to the spouse's tasks. The time horizon for the payoffs also affects the benefits to human capital investments; Jayachandran and Lleras-Muney (2009) investigate the effect of a sudden drop in maternal mortality in Sri Lanka and find that this increase in women's life expectancy increases human capital investments in girls.

In this paper, I develop a model to help explain the timing of human capital investments in the spouse's tasks and the effects of differing time horizons arising from gender differences in life expectancies. Using an innovative new dataset, I study the financial knowledge of husbands and wives, and in doing so I am able to learn more about an aspect of household production that is not well understood. One theme underpinning the human capital literature

is that investments are purposive, and I show that the timing of investments in financial human capital is purposive as well.

3 Theoretical framework

Intuition from a model without uncertainty

This section presents a simple model, assuming no uncertainty, to build intuition for the effects at play. To model the woman's decision to accumulate human capital related to something in which she does not specialize, consider a time span that begins with marriage ($t = 0$) and lasts until the end of the wife's life ($t = T$). The woman will outlive her husband, who passes away at time $t = D$ (see Figure 1). Therefore, widowhood spans from time D to T . Assume the husband specializes in household finances from the beginning of the marriage. The marital match is taken as exogenous.

Assume further that non-wage financial resources can only be used if at least one person in the household has financial knowledge. A new widow with no financial knowledge will not be able to access any non-wage financial resources until she acquires some financial knowledge.² In this case, smoothing of consumption (or earnings) implies that a widow will want at least some financial knowledge at the time of widowhood. This is most realistic in a situation in which the husband was wholly responsible for all household financial matters.

A woman only begins to use this financial knowledge after her husband dies, after which the returns to her stock of financial human capital K are $v(K)$ annually until her death. The present discounted value (after depreciation) of a marginal unit of financial human capital over the course of her life is then:

²Or, one could hire a professional to manage finances, which incurs a monetary rather than time cost. Doing so also requires enough knowledge to evaluate the abilities or trustworthiness of potential advisors and to monitor their activities.

$$P_t = \begin{cases} [\beta(1 - \delta)]^{D-t} \sum_{j=0}^{T-D} \beta^j v'(K_t) & \text{if } t < D \\ \sum_{j=0}^{T-t} \beta^j v'(K_t) & \text{if } t \geq D. \end{cases}$$

Prior to widowhood, the value of a marginal increase in financial human capital is the present value of the stream of annual benefits realized during widowhood for a total of $T - D$ years, discounted by the number of years a woman must wait until the stream begins ($D - t$ years). At time zero, the present value of the benefits are low due to the D -year delay until widowhood. The value increases as a woman approaches widowhood, at which point it declines because of the decreasing number of years the knowledge can be used.

Assuming that units of human capital have been normalized so that their marginal product is one, and that it is independent of the number of units newly acquired or of the current stock of knowledge, the time path of P_t follows Figure 2. P_t can therefore be interpreted as the demand for financial human capital at time t .

This demand is time variant, so a marginal cost curve is required to pin down the time-path of human capital investments. Time allocated to acquiring financial knowledge will be at the expense of other activities. In its simplest form, assume that this marginal cost curve is upward sloping and fixed over time, with its position determined by underlying ability. In this case, as P_t shifts upward, a woman will acquire more human capital until widowhood (with the rate of accumulation increasing with age), after which point she will no longer acquire more units, as the costs exceed the benefits. She will therefore use whatever human capital she acquired by time D for the duration of widowhood.

The derivative of P_t with respect to the time to widowhood D is

$$\frac{dP_t}{dD} = [\beta(1 - \delta)]^{D-t} \frac{1}{1 - \beta} (\beta^T \ln \beta + (\beta - \beta^{T+1-D}) \ln[\beta(1 - \delta)]) < 0. \quad (1)$$

The negative sign of this derivative confirms the intuition that one approaches widowhood, the marginal benefit increases.

The derivative with respect to the length of widowhood (holding D constant):

$$\frac{dP_t}{d(T-D)} = -[\beta(1-\delta)]^{D-t} \frac{1}{1-\beta} \beta^{T+1-D} \ln \beta > 0. \quad (2)$$

Therefore, the more shorter the time to widowhood, the greater the demand for financial human capital. The longer the duration of widowhood, the greater the demand for financial knowledge.

The ratio of the magnitude of the two derivatives is

$$\frac{-\frac{dP_t}{dD}}{\frac{dP_t}{d(T-D)}} = \frac{\beta^T \ln \beta + (\beta - \beta^{T+1-D}) \ln[\beta(1-\delta)]}{\beta^{T+1-D} \ln \beta}. \quad (3)$$

Assuming $\beta = 0.97$ ³ and $\delta = 0.03$, with $T-D$ the length of widowhood and D the time to widowhood, the mean ratio in my sample ranges from 1.53 to 3.28 (see Table 1). The ratio is larger the more imminent widowhood is and the longer the duration of widowhood. The ratio is also larger the greater the depreciation rate of human capital and the lower the discount factor β . Therefore, the effect of the time to widowhood on the acquisition of financial literacy should be greater in magnitude than the effect of the duration of widowhood.

This framework is described in terms of financially specializing husbands and their wives, but it can easily apply to any couple in which one person outlives the other and the shorter living spouse specializes in at least one task. The fact that women have longer life expectancies than men and are typically younger than their husbands makes it easier to test the implications of such a model. Had the longer-living spouse specialized in household

³Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate a structural model using U.S. CEX data and find that high school graduates have a discount factor of 0.96 and college graduates have a discount factor of 0.97.

finances from the beginning of the match, the time-path of human capital investments related to finances would more closely follow the Ben-Porath prediction⁴— front-loaded investments that decline over time.

Model (with uncertainty)

These ideas can be formalized into a model that incorporates the uncertainty of the time of widowhood.

The non-financial specialist in a couple maximizes the following expected utility function:

$$EU = \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t u(x_t, l_t) + \sum_{D=0}^T \left((1 - g_{D+1}) \cdot 0 + g_{D+1} \sum_{D+1}^T \beta^t v(K_t) \right) \quad (4)$$

where the choice variables are

x_t consumption in period t

l_t leisure in period t

I_t time spent investing in financial human capital in period t

K_t stock of financial human capital, which follows an equation of motion $K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_t + f(I_t)$, where δ is the depreciation rate of human capital.

The parameters in this model are

D the time period during which the husband's life ends; widowhood begins at time $t = D + 1$

$v(K)$ per-period returns to K , realized only during widowhood

⁴The Ben-Porath model includes a key feature that I have dropped for simplicity: the ability of the current capital stock to increase the productivity of subsequent investments. This feature allows his model to generate a time path that begins with full time learning and drops sharply, in contrast to the smooth concave function generated by mine.

K_0 given, assumed to be the stock of financial capital brought to the marriage

β subjective discount factor

g_{t+1} = pr(husband dies right before $t + 1$) = pr(husband lives exactly until t).

The second term is the expected value of the returns to financial human capital. Because the stream of per-period returns to human financial capital $v(K)$ are not realized unless the original financial specialist is already deceased, it is multiplied by the probability that a woman becomes a widow at each period. Likewise, if the financial specialist is still alive during a period (with probability $(1 - g_t)$), the returns to financial human capital are zero.

While one might argue that the returns to financial human capital belong in the budget constraint, $v(K)$ can be interpreted as an input into a production function that produces utility from consumption during widowhood. Since this paper is not focused on the particulars of the intertemporal consumption decision, I model $v(K)$ as a source of utility in widowhood outside the budget constraint.

Utility is maximized according to an time constraint:

$$q_t + I_t + l_t = 1 \tag{5}$$

where q_t is time spent working, as well as a lifetime budget constraint. Let

w_t = wage in period t

$R_t = \prod_{j=0}^t \frac{1}{1 + r_{j+1}}$ market discount rate between time 0 and t

A_t = assets exogenous to the woman.

The budget constraint, which assumes perfect capital markets, can be expressed as follows:

$$\sum_{t=0}^T R_t x_t = \sum_{t=0}^T R_t w_t (1 - I_t - l_t) + A_t. \tag{6}$$

The non-specializer's problem

The individual chooses the path of $\{x_t, l_t, I_t, K_{t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ to maximize

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L} = & \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t u(x_t, l_t) + \sum_{D=0}^T g_{D+1} \sum_{D+1}^T \beta^t v(K_t) + \lambda \sum_{t=0}^T [R_t w_t (1 - I_t - l_t) + A_t - R_t x_t] \\ & + \gamma_t \beta^t [(1 - \delta)K_t + f(I_t) - K_{t+1}]. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

First order conditions yield the following (the proof is detailed in Appendix A):

$$u_{l_t} = f'(I_t) \sum_{j=t}^T g_{j+1} [\beta(1 - \delta)]^{j-t} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-(j)}}{1 - \beta} v'(K_{j+1}) \right). \quad (8)$$

The right side is the (discounted, after-depreciation) benefit of marginally increasing I_t , holding constant the subsequent stream of I . The left side is the marginal cost of time (leisure). The expression in parentheses decreases over time (the present discounted value of the stream of benefits during widowhood decreases as the husband's life span increases, or in other words, as the length of widowhood decreases).

The unconditional probability that the husband dies in a given period increases during old age. As this probability approaches 1, the expression in brackets increasingly dominates the equation. Therefore, toward the end of the husband's life, but while the wife anticipates the husband is still alive, she increases her investment. After he is likely to have passed away, then the present discounted value of benefits to financial human capital declines, so her investment in that capital declines as well.

Lastly, a large depreciation rate δ of human capital also increases the incentive to delay the investment. In the context of financial knowledge, depreciation may take the form of specific knowledge becoming obsolete as financial institutions and rules change.

In sum, the model predicts that a woman will acquire financial knowledge very slowly at

the beginning of the marriage and delay larger investments in human capital. The rate of investing will increase as the expected time of widowhood approaches. After her husband dies, she takes charge of the finances and accrues payoffs to her financial knowledge.

4 Data

The data for the empirical analysis come from the Cognitive Economics Survey (CogEcon),⁵ which is an innovative new survey of a national sample of persons 51 and older and their spouses regardless of age. The first wave, administered in the spring and summer of 2008, includes a twenty-five question battery on financial literacy, detailed measures of income, wealth and portfolio allocation plus measures of risk tolerance, self-assessed financial knowledge, use of records and other sources of information and several questions on decision-making. An additional survey was administered to these respondents in 2009 to follow up after the onset of the economic downturn beginning in the fall of 2008.

These respondents also participated in the Cognition and Aging in the USA study (CogUSA),⁶ which includes an extremely detailed cognitive assessment. In addition, respondents were asked questions about their subjective expectations, including their subjective survival probabilities. The combined survey allows for the linking of cognitive and economic measures. Furthermore, unlike many other studies that designate one financial respondent in a household, this study collects measures of financial decision-making and financial knowledge from both husbands and wives.

Because the model predicts that women will increase their financial knowledge acquisition

⁵The Cognitive Economics Survey is supported by NIA program project P01 AG026571, “Behavior on Surveys and in the Economy Using HRS,” Robert J. Willis, PI. In addition to Willis, University of Michigan faculty Gwen Fisher, Miles Kimball, Matthew Shapiro, and Tyler Shumway and graduate students Brooke Heltppie and Joanne Hsu had roles in designing and fielding the CogEcon study.

⁶The CogUSA Study is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging, grant number R37 AG007137, “Assessing and Improving Cognitive Measurements in the HRS,” John J. McArdle, PI.

prior to the death of their spouses, the empirical analysis requires measures of the expected time of widowhood. Life expectancies and survival probabilities for CogEcon respondents are drawn from 2004 period life tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the National Vital Statistics System at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.⁷ Alternative survival measures employ subjective survival questions as well as objective survival probabilities predicted using the Health and Retirement Study, a much larger scale longitudinal survey of similarly-aged individuals.⁸ These measures are described in more detail in Section 5.4.

4.1 Sample and demographics

CogEcon collects information from 748 unique households⁹, defined as couples or individuals without partners. The analysis sample includes 233 couples in which both members have participated in the survey (466 respondents). 286 unmarried respondents also participated in the survey. An additional 229 respondents have partners about whom we have partial or no information due to complete or partial non-response. Further information about response rates and the derivation of the analysis sample can be found in Appendix B.

Table 2 reports the demographic characteristics of all respondents with spouses in the sample. The average age of women is 60.5 years, with men about 2.5 years older. According to life tables, these women face a life expectancy of 24 years, while their husbands have a mean life expectancy of about 19 years. Men have slightly more years of education than their wives in this sample. Only 16 percent of wives report being most knowledgeable about

⁷The life tables by age and sex used in my analysis are found in Tables 2 and 3 from Arias (2007). These 2004 life tables were the most up-to-date versions published by the National Center for Health Statistics at the time the CogEcon Survey was fielded.

⁸The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute of Aging (grant number NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. Some variables were provided by the RAND HRS Data file (Data, 2010). See <http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu> for more information.

⁹Three same-sex households are excluded as there are no established patterns that indicate that the shorter-living member is more likely to be the financial specialist in such couples.

finances.

4.2 Outcomes of interest: financial knowledge

General financial literacy

The survey includes a financial literacy battery of 25 questions. Each of these questions is a statement, and the respondent is asked whether s/he thinks the statement is true or false, and how sure s/he is of that that response on a twelve-point scale based on her/his degree of certainty (see Figure 3). Whether a respondent sees the true or false version of a question is randomized. Questions are converted to the true version so that the scale can be interpreted as “0% surely (correct answer)” to “100% surely (correct answer).” The responses are re-scaled to a zero-one scale.¹⁰ An individual’s financial sophistication score is calculated by taking each respondent’s mean score across questions in the battery and normalizing across all survey respondents. A within-couple relative score is computed using the wife-husband difference in normalized mean scores.

Topics covered include interest compounding, diversification and risk, financial terms, stock market concepts, taxation, and inflation. For the full text of each question, see Appendix B.3. To account for the fact that not all respondents may participate in the stock market, some analyses will employ a financial literacy score that excludes the fifteen stock related questions. As can be seen in the summary statistics in Table 3, men have, on average, higher levels of financial literacy than women whether or not stock questions are included.

¹⁰The re-scaling is based on the assumption that respondents have in mind a probability that the statement in the question is true, and they select their answer choice by rounding off their probability to the nearest choice on our 12-point scale. We can then construct intervals within which a respondent would round to each answer choice, and the point-value we assign is the midpoint of this interval. For instance, those who believe a statement is true with certainties between 95 percent and 100 percent would round up to 100 percent surely true, so that choice is assigned the value 0.975.

Additional outcomes

While financial literacy is the central measure of financial knowledge in this paper, I also replicate the analysis with several other measures to see if similar patterns hold with respect to the imminence and expected duration of widowhood. The 2008 survey asks each respondent to rate on a six point scale his ability to deal with day-to-day financial matters as well as his understanding of the stock market. In 2009, respondents were asked how often they follow the stock market, as well as whether they think stock returns have exceeded bond returns over the last 100 years. Respondents' beliefs about stock market returns, as well as the extent to which they follow the market, complement financial literacy as measures of general knowledge because they have direct bearing on financial planning, stock market participation, and investment behavior. Correct beliefs about stock market returns may also reflect greater involvement in household investments. The full text of these questions are provided in Appendix B.

4.3 Cognitive ability, health, and risk tolerance measures

While the model emphasizes the effect of a spouse's mortality on the division of labor, a spouse's declining cognition or health status are other factors that would similarly necessitate learning about his tasks. Summary statistics for these factors are reported in Table 3.

One of the most widely accepted theories of cognitive abilities is the *Gf-Gc* theory (Cattell, 1941; Horn, 1965; Horn and Cattell, 1966, 1967). Primary abilities are divided into two broad dimensions: fluid intelligence (*Gf*) and crystallized intelligence (*Gc*). Fluid intelligence represents reasoning abilities that result from biological influences on intellectual development, such as heredity or injuries to the nervous system. Crystallized intelligence refers to the use of accumulated knowledge and skill and represents the results of educational investments and experience rather than underlying ability. The distinction between fluid and

crystallized intelligence is similar to the notion of ability versus human capital in economics. Other cognitive abilities include episodic memory and processing speed.

Financial literacy can be interpreted both as a form of human capital as well as a form of crystallized intelligence. While crystallized intelligence tends to increase through the accumulation of knowledge, fluid intelligence peaks early in life and declines over the remaining life cycle. Psychologists have verified that both fluid intelligence and the episodic memory decline with age (McArdle et al., 2007; Verhaeghen and Salthouse, 1997; McArdle et al., 2002). Furthermore, episodic memory is typically among the first cognitive functions to deteriorate during aging (Backman et al., 2001). Measures of fluid intelligence and episodic memory can thus be used to control for the cognitive decline of respondents and to conduct robustness checks on my results.

Fluid intelligence is measured using a normalized W-score of the Woodcock-Johnson III Number Series test. Respondents are given a sequence of numbers with a missing number, and they are asked the value of the missing number. The W-scores used by psychologists are scaled using a large external norming sample, but here I normalize the scores among all CogUSA respondents for easier interpretation. Episodic memory (conceptualized as a form of fluid intelligence) is measured using a Total Recall score, which is derived by testing both immediate and delayed recall of a list of ten words. Again, I use scores that are normalized using all CogUSA respondents. As can be seen in Table 3, in the CogEcon sample, men tend to have higher Number Series scores, but lower Total Recall scores, than women.

Additional cognition measures can be used in place of financial knowledge as falsification tests. I will use a variety of cognitive measures: working memory, processing speed, verbal reasoning, and numeracy/mathematical skill. The Mental Status battery includes the Serial 7s test, which is a measure of working memory, or the ability to actively store and manipulate information in order to conduct complex cognitive tasks, including learning or reasoning. The Mental Status score also uses tests of backwards counting, date naming, object naming,

and President/Vice President naming. The Woodcock-Johnson III Visual Matching test measures processing speed, and studies show that “measures of speed tend to share about 75% of the age-related variance with various cognitive measures” (Salthouse, 2000). The Woodcock-Johnson III Verbal Analogies test measures the respondent’s ability to reason using lexical knowledge; it is a verbal measure of fluid intelligence. Lastly, numeracy or mathematical skill is measured with the Woodcock-Johnson III Calculation test. The Number Series and Calculation tests are the two scores that are most highly correlated with financial literacy.

In addition to his cognitive decline, a husband’s poor physical health may also contribute to a woman taking over his tasks. One overall measure of health is the question, “Would you say your health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?” This self-rated health measure is coded from 1 (for poor) and 5 (for excellent). Women rate their health slightly higher than men (See Table 3), though this difference is not statistically significant.

Lastly, a risk tolerant woman may be more willing to delay investments in her husband’s tasks than a risk averse woman. The Cognitive Economics survey asks questions about hypothetical gambles similar to those asked in the Health and Retirement Study to measure risk tolerance (Barsky et al., 1997). Respondents are assigned one of six ordinal categories of risk tolerance based on which of the hypothetical gambles are accepted or rejected.

5 Empirical results and discussion

5.1 The CFO and the household division of labor

The most direct question related to household division of labor asks “Which member of the immediate family is most knowledgeable about your family’s assets, debts, and retirement planning?” Respondents may specify “me,” “my spouse/partner,” “both me and my spouse/partner,”

or “someone else in the family” as the household’s “Chief Financial Officer.” About 16 percent of women in couples report being most knowledgeable, and less than half report being at least equally knowledgeable (see Table 2).

A unique advantage of the CogEcon study is that it poses the same questions to both members of a couple whenever possible. Table 4 cross-tabulates the two members’ responses to the question about who is most financially knowledgeable within the household. 152 couples, comprising 65 percent of these married couples, gave strongly consistent answers. This includes couples for which both specify “both of us”, or one member specifies “me” and the partner/spouse specifies “my spouse/partner.” Weakly consistent answers are answers that are not the same but are non-contradictory. These include cases in which one member specifies “both of us,” whereas the spouse/partner chooses either “me” or “my spouse/partner,” or if one member of a couple skips the question. 71 couples, or 30 percent of married couples, gave weakly consistent answers. Other combinations are contradictory and are considered inconsistent; ten couples, or four percent of married couples, fall in this category. Because of the small number of couples with inconsistent answers, the analysis will ignore these discrepancies and will generally consider the woman’s response as representative of the couple.

To verify that the question on financial knowledge provides information about the division of labor, I investigate how financial knowledge relates to financial decision-making using the question “Who (among members of your immediate family) makes the decisions about how to save for retirement and other large expenses?” Responses to the two questions are highly correlated. Among those in couples, over 60 percent of respondents name the same person (or persons, in the case of the “both” answer choice) as the most knowledgeable as well as the decision-maker. Over one third of respondents state that both members of the couple make decisions while only one is most knowledgeable, a small number state the reverse, and for 2 percent of couples both are most knowledgeable but one makes the decisions. Only about

2 percent of respondents give inconsistent answers to the two questions— for instance, the partner is most knowledgeable, but the respondent himself makes the major decisions. Since these inconsistent responses are so few in number and because a majority of respondents state that decisions are made by both members of the couple, the most knowledgeable person is a meaningful measure without incorporating additional data about who makes the major decisions.

Table 5 reports the characteristics of households with a female, male, or joint CFO. Only 16 percent of couples have female CFOs. The CFO tends to be more educated, have more financial literacy, and have more fluid intelligence (as measured by the Number Series score) than his or her spouse; this is true for couples with male CFOs as well as those with female CFOs. In addition, the intra-couple age gap is smaller in couples with female CFOs than those with male CFOs. This is consistent with the idea that where one spouse has a comparative advantage with respect to fluid intelligence or education, s/he becomes the CFO. Also, small differences in the Number Series score become amplified in the differences in financial literacy, which may be a product of specialization.

5.2 Descriptive non-parametric analysis: Financial literacy by age

The cross-section can be used as a synthetic cohort to see if patterns of financial knowledge within couples change with age. My model predicts that women should increase their financial knowledge as they approach widowhood. Furthermore, if their husbands' cognition and/or health deteriorate earlier than their own, women will have greater incentive to acquire more knowledge relative to their husbands. Because the survey is not currently longitudinal, there are no measurements of baseline knowledge for women. To measure changes in financial knowledge in the synthetic cohort, I instead use the husbands' knowledge as a baseline.

Figure 4 shows the age profile of the financial sophistication score based on the husband's

age. The age profile is estimated using a lowess plot (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing), which non-parametrically estimates:

$$\text{wife's financial literacy} - \text{husband's financial literacy} = f(\text{husband's age}). \quad (9)$$

Men's financial sophistication follows a flat or upside-down U-shape, whereas women's financial sophistication score is upward sloping with respect to their husband's age, which can be seen in the graph on the left. A similar pattern emerges when stock questions are excluded, as seen in Figure 5.

To see if this pattern holds when women are matched to their husbands, I plot the wife-husband difference in financial sophistication on the right side graph of Figure 4. Within couples, the wife's score rises relative to her husband's score as he ages and his life expectancy shortens; this is true also when excluding stock questions in Figure 5. These patterns are not sensitive to bandwidth choice. Univariate regressions of the wife-husband difference in financial scores on the husband's life expectancy show the same negative relationship. The slopes for the full financial score estimate and the non-stock financial score estimate are statistically significant at the ten percent and five percent level, respectively (see Table 6). This is consistent with the notion that women invest in their human capital as their husbands age.

5.2.1 Possible confounders

Is this active learning on the part of the women, in anticipation of their husbands' decline in health and cognition? The age profiles in financial knowledge detailed above are also consistent with two different explanations unrelated to my theoretical model. First, the gains in women's knowledge relative to men may not actually reflect any actual gains; women's knowledge may remain constant while their husbands' cognition declines. Secondly, older

women may have been in charge of finances throughout their marriages, thereby violating the assumptions of the synthetic cohort analysis employed here, and the results may merely reflect cohort effects.

Cognitive decline of husbands

One might be concerned that these age profiles are generated by older men paired with younger women, such that an increase in the wife-husband financial knowledge gap is driven solely by a decline in the husband’s ability, rather than a true increase in the woman’s ability. Figure 6 shows age profiles of various other cognitive scores, plotted against the husband’s age (comparable to the upper left panel of Figure 4). These graphs are generated by locally weighted scatterplot (lowess) smoothing. Aside from the Total Recall score, none of the other cognitive measures have a wife-husband gap that increases with the husband’s age. The scores for husbands and wives track each other remarkably closely by the husband’s age; if anything, for Verbal Analogies (a measure of reasoning using lexical knowledge) and Visual Matching (a measure of processing speed), men seem to gain on women at the oldest ages. Furthermore, the Number Series scores, which have been shown to be strong predictors of financial literacy and wealth (McArdle et al., 2009), have parallel profiles for both men and women when plotted against the husband’s age. These patterns suggest that the age profile of financial literacy scores does not merely track underlying patterns of cognitive decline of husbands and wives. Because the Total Recall score is the exception, all regression analyses will include controls for the husbands’ and wives’ Recall Score.

Cohort effects

Using the cross-section as a synthetic cohort assumes that the experiences of individuals over the age distribution of the cross-section reflect the experiences of individuals as they

age through each successive cohort, as if I had observed a single cohort longitudinally.¹¹ An alternative hypothesis consistent with my results is that older women have been household CFOs throughout the marriage, while younger women are less likely to do so. This would cause the synthetic cohort to produce spurious support for the model’s predictions.

However, social changes across cohorts suggest otherwise; historical marriage and divorce patterns are likely to bias the data *against* my model’s predictions. Women in younger cohorts are likely to have married at an older age, as seen in the CPS and Census data in Figure 7.¹² Although the median age of women married before 1949 (the 5th percentile in my data of the year of first marriage, marked on the figure with a vertical line) was slightly higher, there was subsequently an upward trend over time. Therefore, the younger women in my sample have had greater incentive to gain financial knowledge prior to marriage. In addition, if the dispersion of power within a couple is greater when the spousal age gap is larger, we may not expect the younger spouses of the older men to have as much control over finances. Younger couples are likely to be more “egalitarian” than older couples, and therefore older women might be less likely (and older men more likely) to be household CFO.

The prospect of divorce, which has changed considerably over time, may also lead women to learn about finances earlier in life. Historical divorce rates in the United States are shown in Figure 8.¹³ Although the rates were slightly higher in the mid 1940s than in the 1950s, divorce rates climbed rapidly through the 1960s and 70s. Divorce rates remained high through the 80s and declined only more recently. The sharp increase in divorce rates would

¹¹One common use of the synthetic cohort is the computation of life table life expectancies, which are expected to be downward biased because younger cohorts will have the benefit of medical advances not available to those who are already elderly.

¹²This figure was constructed using Table MS-2 posted online by the U.S. Census Bureau at <http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hh-fam.html>.

¹³Statistics prior to 1950 are drawn from U.S. Bureau of the Census (1954) and are based on population figures including the armed forces overseas. Numbers from 1950 onward are from U.S. Census Bureau (2004); divorce rates for 1998-2002 exclude California, Colorado, Indiana, and Louisiana from both the numerator as well as the population denominator.

create incentives for the younger women in my sample to insure themselves by acquiring more knowledge earlier in adulthood. Figure 9 confirms a similar pattern in my sample; the women who are married to the oldest men are less likely to have ever been divorced.

These patterns, in addition to changing norms due to the rise of feminism, would create greater incentives for younger women (relative to older women) to learn early and/or become CFOs in the household. All of these cohort effects should produce downward bias on any estimates of the effects of life expectancy on financial knowledge.

5.3 Regression analysis using life table widowhood measures

Because CogEcon surveys both the husband and the wife in a couple whenever possible, I can link members of a couple for analysis. I estimate the effect of expected time to widowhood and expected length of widowhood (derivations in Appendix C) on women's financial knowledge. Table 3 reports summary statistics of the financial knowledge variables and measures of husband's life expectancy and widowhood used in the analysis. Women have on average -0.37 standard deviations less financial literacy than their husbands, though this gap narrows to -0.31 when stock-related questions are excluded. Women are most knowledgeable about finances in only 16 percent of couples, but they are equally knowledgeable in 33 percent of couples. In this sample, life tables indicate an expected time to widowhood (conditional on the woman outliving the man) of about 14 years, with an expected duration of widowhood (also conditional on the woman outliving the man) of 12.9 years.¹⁴

Table 7 uses the couple-level data to analyze the the difference between a woman and her

¹⁴These figures use life table aggregate statistics from individuals of all marital statuses, so it assumes that the mortality of husbands and wives are uncorrelated. If one does not condition on the woman outliving the husband, life tables also indicate an average life expectancy of almost 20 years for the husbands, with wife-husband difference in life expectancies of over four years. All analysis using these unconditional measures yield similar results.

husband's financial sophistication mean score and presents results for the following equation:

$$d(\text{financial sophistication}) = \gamma_1(\text{expected time to widowhood}) + \gamma_2(\text{expected duration of widowhood}) + X\beta + \epsilon \quad (10)$$

where $d(x)$ designates the wife-husband difference in x .

The third column of Table 7 estimates the equation with no covariates, while the second column includes the usual education and health controls. The first column adds the memory and fluid intelligence (Number Series) of both husband and wife, and the woman's risk tolerance. Including these cognition variables increases the magnitude and precision of the estimated coefficient on the time to widowhood. A one-year reduction in the expected time to widowhood is associated with a statistically significant .04 standard deviation increase in the wife-husband difference in normalized financial sophistication, which is about 11 percent of the mean difference. This result arises even when controlling for the Recall score, a cognitive measure that declines markedly with age.

Several of the questions in the financial sophistication battery are related to the stock market, and these concepts may not be relevant to members of households who do not participate in the stock market. I construct a second financial literacy score from the ten questions that are unrelated to the stock market and normalize them over all respondents. Table 8 repeats the financial sophistication analysis with this smaller set of non-stock related financial literacy questions. The coefficient on the husband's life expectancy increases substantially in magnitude; in the specification with full controls in the first column, this coefficient increases 15 percent to -0.048 from -0.041 in Table 7. The coefficient on the expected length of widowhood is unchanged and is still statistically insignificant.

The Number Series score is a strong predictor of financial knowledge, and since this is a measure of fluid intelligence, having a higher Number Series can be interpreted as

lowering the woman’s marginal cost of acquiring knowledge. A one standard deviation increase in the wife’s Number Series is associated with a 0.32 standard deviation increase in her financial literacy, relative to her husband. Coefficients on the control variables are generally as expected: lower risk tolerance for women is associated with more financial knowledge, and the lower the education and health levels of the husbands, the greater the woman’s financial knowledge. Likewise, the greater are the women’s levels of health or education, the greater their financial knowledge, and these effects are smaller in magnitude than those of their husbands’ levels.

Even after including for the Total Recall score, which declines strongly with age and therefore helps control for the husband’s cognitive decline, I still find a statistically significant effect of time to widowhood on financial literacy. The magnitude of the effect is large; if all women acquired financial literacy at the estimated 0.04 standard deviation per year, almost 80 percent of women in the sample would fully catch up with their husband’s current level of financial literacy before the expected onset of widowhood. The coefficients on the expected duration of widowhood are positive — the longer the length of widowhood, the more financial literacy the woman has relative to her husband — but are not statistically significant. This is consistent with the fact that the model predicts the effect of the marginal year closer widowhood should be much larger than the marginal year during widowhood.

As a robustness check, I run false regressions of equation (10) by replacing the difference in financial sophistication scores on the left hand side with differences in cognition scores. Table 9 reports the results for the six cognition scores detailed in Section 4.3. Because the left hand side variables are all wife-husband differences in normalized scores, the coefficients are directly comparable to each other. The columns are in order from most highly correlated to least correlated to financial literacy. All but one of the falsification regressions have coefficients on the time to widowhood that smaller in magnitude than in financial literacy; two of them have positive estimated coefficients. The one measure with a similar coefficient

on time to widowhood, Total Recall, has a low correlation with financial literacy; furthermore, the main regressions in Tables 7 and 8 control for the recall score. This demonstrates that the estimated effect of time to widowhood on financial literacy is not a spurious relationship solely attributable to the cognitive decline of men.

5.4 Robustness: regression analysis using alternative probabilistic survival measures

The ideal explanatory variables would be the woman's subjective expectation of her husband's life expectancy as well as her subjective expected length of widowhood. Life table life expectancies by age and sex mask much of the variation in actual survival expectations across individuals. In the absence of questions eliciting expectations of the timing of one's partner's mortality, I will need to impose various assumptions in order to derive a proxy for these expectations. In this section, I construct objective and subjective probabilistic measures of the imminence and duration of widowhood, and then I present the results using each of these measures. Converting probabilistic measures to measures in time units as used in the main analysis would require strong assumptions about the shape of each individual's entire survival function, so I leave these survival measures in their probabilistic form.

The equations I estimate with these alternate survival measures are identical to Equations 10 but replace the expected length of widowhood with the husband's probability of surviving at least another ten years, and the expected length of widowhood by the wife-husband difference in their respective ten-year survival probabilities. These results generally confirm that the lower the husband's survival probability (and therefore the more imminent widowhood is), the greater the wife's level of financial knowledge.

5.4.1 Life table survival probabilities

The most straight-forward approach would be to assume that individuals have rational expectations in accordance with published life tables as shown in Table 7. In the previous analysis, I have used the expected time to widowhood and the expected years of widowhood calculated from 2004 period life tables, by age and sex. An alternative measure from the life table is the ten-year-ahead survival probability, which is defined as $\prod_{x=age}^{10} (1 - q(x))$, where $q(x)$ is the life table hazard of dying between age x and $x + 1$.

Using life tables requires the assumption that a woman’s expectation of the timing and length of widowhood are, in expectation, the same as those in these life tables. One problem is that life tables are constructed as population-level averages, and particular individuals’ life expectancies and mortality probabilities will diverge (either positively or negatively) from the life tables as a result to individual characteristics such as health status. Women will have some information, some observed in the survey and others not, that may make their expectations deviate from life tables.

5.4.2 Subjective survival probabilities

While life tables reflect the experience of entire populations, individual expectations are likely to deviate heterogeneously from these population measures. I use subjective survival probability questions that are asked of each CogEcon respondent in the second wave of CogUSA. These questions ask “What is the percent chance that you will live to be X or more?” where X is an age that is between 11 and 15 years in the future (or more, in the case of spouses who are younger than 50). Therefore, these responses represent the subjective $Pr(\text{alive at age } X | \text{current age})$. Appendix B.4 describes these questions in more detail.

A number of studies have analyzed the relationship between actual mortality and the subjective survival probabilities elicited in surveys. Subjective survival probabilities have

been shown, on average, to be close to those in life tables, and they covary with variables like health conditions, smoking behavior and socio-economic status in the same way as actual mortality outcomes do (Hurd and McGarry, 1995). The probabilities are consistent with individuals' observed mortality patterns (Elder, 2007; Smith et al., 2001) and are updated by individuals in response to new information, such as the onset of health conditions (Hurd and McGarry, 2002; Smith et al., 2001). Perozek (2008) uses responses to survival expectations questions to construct subjective life tables which are shown to predict the unusual direction of revisions to subsequent Social Security Actuary life expectancies.

Whether or not these responses predict mortality, one can argue that individual life-cycle behavior reflects subjective beliefs rather than actuarial probabilities. Therefore, subjective probabilities can be used in my analysis, with additional assumptions required to account for the different target ages faced by respondents. This strategy assumes that a woman's beliefs about her husband's mortality are identical to her husband's own beliefs about his own mortality.¹⁵

Because the time horizon of the subjective survival questions varies between 11 and 15 years ahead, responses for different time horizons are not comparable at face value. I interpolate a ten-year-ahead survival probability by assuming assuming that one-year hazard rates are constant over the 11-15 year horizons of the subjective survival questions. Constant hazards implies that $Pr(\text{alive in 10 years} | \text{age}) = (1 - q(\text{age}))^{10}$ and $Pr(\text{alive at age } X | \text{age}) = (1 - q(\text{age}))^X$, where $q(\cdot)$ is the annual mortality hazard and X the target age posed in the subjective survival questions. Solving both equations for $q(\cdot)$, setting them equal to each other and rearranging yields:

$$Pr(\text{alive in 10 years} | \text{age}) = Pr_{\text{subj}}(\text{alive at age } X | \text{age})^{\frac{10}{X - \text{age}}} \quad (11)$$

¹⁵Unfortunately for my analysis, to my knowledge no surveys that field these subjective survival expectations questions query both members of a couple about his/her spouse's survival prospects.

I calculate this ten-year-ahead survival probability from the age 75 question for those under 65, since the constant hazard assumption is more realistic for shorter time horizons. I retain the original values of those who report 0 and 100 percent probabilities. These probabilities have a 0.56 correlation with life table probabilities, with a wife-husband difference that is smaller than the life tables (see Tables 10 and 11).

Rounding and survey noise

Here, I take the responses to the subjective survival probability questions at face value. However, respondents may round their responses; Manski and Molinari (2010) analyze expectations questions in the HRS and find that respondents round to varying degrees. CogEcon asks a number of follow-up questions in the expectations module that shed some light on the extent of rounding.

Those under 65 who report a survival probability to 75 that is a multiple of 10 or 25 (but not 50) are asked a followup: “When you said X percent just now, did you mean this as an exact number or were you rounding or approximating?” Those who reported they approximated were then asked, “What range of numbers did you have in mind when you said 50 percent?” Of the 322 who reported a multiple of 10 or 25 (but not 50), 205 stated they had approximated. To better understand the direction of rounding, one can compare the reported probability to the midpoint of the range later reported. For 40.0 percent of those 322, the reported survival probability and the midpoint of the range are the same; 29.3 percent report a probability that is less than the midpoint, and the remaining 30.7 percent report a probability exceeding the midpoint. The mean difference is 1.46 percentage points. This suggests that rounding may occur symmetrically. Whether noise is introduced through rounding or through general survey noise, these measures will produce attenuation bias in my estimates.

5.4.3 Objective predicted survival probabilities (HRS)

Because CogEcon and the Health and Retirement Study share many socio-demographic, cognitive and physical health measures, one can use the effect of these variables on observed mortality in HRS to predict mortality for CogEcon respondents.

I estimate a probit model of survival using respondents of the 1998 wave of the HRS and their survival outcomes using the 2008 Tracker File. The covariates include gender, race, years of education, couple status, birth year, episodic memory, mental status, depressive symptoms, an index of health measures, self-rated health, smoking status, and alcohol consumption, all measured in 1998. I use the estimated parameters to predict ten-year survival for CogEcon respondents. As can be seen in Tables 10 and 11, these predicted survival probabilities are highly correlated with life table probabilities, and have less variance and are of higher levels than the subjective probabilities.

Standard error adjustment for two-step estimation

Estimation with predicted survival probabilities uses a two-stage procedure in which mortalities are predicted in the first stage using HRS data, and the main equation of interest is estimated in the second stage. Since the husband's predicted survival and the difference between the wives' and their husbands' survival probabilities are predicted with error, the variance-covariance matrix of the main estimating equation will require an adjustment for the generated regressors. The adjustments made here are suggested by Murphy and Topel (1985), and details about the adjustments can be found in Appendix D. Due to the large sample size of the first-stage HRS estimates, the correct standard errors are only slightly larger than the uncorrected ones.

5.4.4 Results with alternate probabilistic life measures

This section presents regression results using the alternate measures of survival. Summary statistics for these probabilistic measures are reported in Tables 10 and 11. Figure 10 displays scatterplots of the survival probabilities generated using each of the methods for CogEcon respondents in couples and whose partners are also in the survey.

In order to maintain comparability of units across the measures, I have chosen to use ten-year survival probabilities instead of life expectancies. Using ten-year probabilities involves weaker assumptions (as outlined above) than life expectancies, which require assumptions about the entire hazard function from the individual's current age onward. In both tables, the first column presents results using the ten-year probabilities from U.S. life table; the second from subjective survival probabilities, and the third from objective predicted probabilities from HRS probit estimation. Since all of these measures are ten-year survival probabilities, the coefficients on the husband's survival probabilities are comparable across specifications, as are the coefficients on the difference between a woman's and her husband's survival probabilities. However, since the first and last columns are based on averages (by age and sex for life tables, and for various personal characteristics in the case of the HRS estimates), I expect these coefficients to be estimated with less precision. On the other hand, the subjective survival measures are subject to survey noise, which should lead to attenuation bias.

All of the regressions reported in Table 12 show that the effect of husbands' survival probabilities on financial sophistication is negative, as predicted by the model, though the estimates are not statistically significant. With subjective probabilities, a ten percent decrease in husband's survival probability is associated with an increase in the woman's financial sophistication score of 0.06 standard deviations over her husband's score. While the signs of the effect of husband's survival probabilities are consistent with the model's

predictions for both types of financial knowledge, the estimated magnitudes appear to be small.

Regressions with non-stock financial literacy as the dependent variable are reported in Table 13. Like the main results with expected time to widowhood, the magnitude of the effects of the husband’s survival probabilities are much larger for non-stock financial literacy than general financial sophistication; for the HRS predicted probabilities, the effect is doubled. This suggests that increases in financial knowledge with the risk of widowhood are being made both in the realm of stocks and even more so in more basic topics.

In all sets of regressions, the effect of the expected duration of widowhood (as measured as the difference in the survival probabilities of husbands and wives) is sensitive to the method used for deriving those probabilities. Given that the length of widowhood is a secondary effect, it is not surprising that the effect of widowhood is weaker than the effect of the timing of the onset of widowhood.

5.5 Regression analysis using other outcomes

I now turn to additional measures of financial knowledge: women’s self-rated financial knowledge, historical knowledge of the stock market, and closely following the stock market. Because these measures are absolute levels rather than relative to their husbands, the use of the synthetic cohort for these outcomes is less compelling. Nevertheless, results from analysis using each of these measures instead of financial literacy provide additional supporting evidence that women increase knowledge as their husband’s life expectancies decrease.

Self-rated knowledge

The CogEcon survey includes two self-rated measures of financial knowledge. Respondents are asked the degree to which they agree with the following statements: “I am good at

dealing with day-to-day financial matters, such as checking accounts, credit cards, mortgages, installment payments, and budgeting,” and “I understand the stock market reasonably well.” Respondents select from a six-point scale: strongly agree (six points), agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, disagree, and disagree strongly (one point). Summary statistics for this and subsequent financial knowledge measures are reported in Table 14. On average, women report much higher levels of financial skills than stock skills (5.0 versus 2.9). The first two columns of Table 15 show ordered probit regressions of women’s self-rated measures on their husband’s life expectancy, their expected length of widowhood, and other control variables. Like the analysis of financial literacy, these regressions show that reductions in the time to widowhood are associated with increases in self-rated stock market knowledge and self-rated financial skills. The coefficients on husband’s life expectancy are statistically significant in both regressions. Ordered probit regressions of the same specifications yield similar results.

While the first two columns of Table 15 only use the wife’s self-report, columns (3) and (4) use the wife-husband difference used in the financial battery analysis. The main outcome used in this paper, the wife-husband difference in financial sophistication scores, is a relative measure of the woman in relation to her husband. While the financial sophistication battery allows for an objective ratio, the husbands and wives may have different cut-points on the latent variable underlying each self-reported outcome. Therefore, the self-reports may not be appropriate for use as a wife-husband relative measure. That said, these regressions still yield the expected result of negative coefficients on time to widowhood.

Historical knowledge and following the stock market

Another outcome measure is knowledge about the historical returns of stocks relative to bonds. The following question was posed in the post-crash (2009) wave of the CogEcon survey: “On average *over the last 100 years*, how do you think the *annual rate of return*

on stocks has compared to *the annual rate of return on bonds?*” Respondents may indicate whether stock returns have been higher than bond returns, bond returns have been higher than stock returns, and both returns were the same. In the period between 1908 and 2006, the arithmetic average of annual total real stock market returns was 8.5 percent, while the arithmetic average of annual long-term government bond returns was 5.5 percent (Siegel, 2007). Answering this question correctly not only is evidence of greater financial knowledge, but also has implications for stock market participation, retirement planning, and other financial matters. About 57 percent of women gave correct answers (see Table 14). Average marginal effects from a probit estimation with an outcome of one if respondents report that stock returns have been higher than bond returns are reported in the fifth column Table 15. As predicted by my model, women with less time to widowhood are more likely to answer correctly, and the average marginal effect is statistically significant at the five percent level.

The CogEcon post-crash survey also asks respondents “How closely do you follow the stock market?” with the answer choices “very closely,” “somewhat,” and “not at all.” Following the stock market more closely may be a sign of greater involvement in handling finances or increased learning about the economic and financial environment. An ordered probit of this question is reported in the sixth column of Table 15. As the time to widowhood shortens, women are more likely to follow the stock market more closely (statistically significant at the one percent level). This effect is consistent with women learning more about finances as they approach widowhood.

6 Conclusion

Empirical studies on financial literacy have generally shown that women have less financial knowledge than men (Fonseca et al., 2010; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2008; Kotlikoff and Bernheim, 2001). One possible explanation for this gender gap is that it reflects the household division

of labor. Unequal life expectancies of household members imply that a division of labor that emerges when the couple forms will eventually change when the longer-living spouse takes over the responsibilities held by the shorter-living spouse. Household financial management is a task that is frequently the responsibility of the husband, who generally has a shorter life expectancy than the wife. Because the benefits of financial knowledge for women are not realized until she is a widow, the theoretical model predicts that a woman has an incentive to delay the acquisition of financial knowledge until later in life. Conversely, because knowledge cannot be acquired instantaneously, she also has an incentive to begin her acquisition of financial knowledge well before widowhood so that she will be equipped with the knowledge needed to manage her wealth when her husband dies.

Using matched data on wives and husbands, I show that women do indeed increase their financial knowledge on a number of dimensions as their husbands age. Women acquire financial literacy at a rate of 0.04 standard deviations per year; at this rate, about 80 percent of the women in the sample would catch up with their husbands in financial literacy before the expected onset of widowhood. In addition, women have increased self-rated financial skills and follow the stock market more closely as widowhood becomes more imminent. Because cohort effects related to age at first marriage and divorce probabilities work against my finding a result, my estimates are underestimates of the actual effects. Furthermore, I find statistically significant effects of the time to widowhood in spite of the measurement error associated with using population-average life table calculations.

However, I do not find a statistically significant effect of the expected length of widowhood on women's financial knowledge. This may not be surprising given that the model predicts a much larger effect of time to widowhood than the length of widowhood. Assuming a discount factor of 0.97 and no depreciation, the effect of time to widowhood is predicted to be on average 50 percent larger than the duration's effect, with the gap widening if human capital is assumed to depreciate. Furthermore, while the model does not specify the functional form

of the returns to financial knowledge, the financial decisions faced by widows may be less complex than the planning decisions made earlier in the life cycle. If this is the case, then the marginal returns to financial knowledge may decline sharply after a certain threshold. Women may aim to reach a level of financial knowledge at widowhood sufficient to manage their decumulation, but not necessarily so much as to make complex investment decisions.

The financial literacy outcome uses the husband's literacy as a baseline in order to identify effects from a synthetic cohort formed by a cross-section. My results show that older women do indeed plan strategically for the future by investing in financial knowledge as widowhood becomes more imminent. This supports the idea that the poor economic outcomes associated with widowhood may reflect insufficient preparation due to an unexpectedly early onset of widowhood. In addition, poor outcomes may also reflect low levels of husband's financial knowledge; in this case, merely catching up with their husbands (as most women would if they continue to acquire knowledge at the rates I have estimated) may not equip women with the tools needed to manage their finances alone.

The model can be applied not only to financial literacy but also to any other task specialized in by a spouse. In addition, the model can also be generalized to other questions related to the length of time a person can depend on a spouse to continue specializing. Korniotis and Kumar (2011) find that older investors exhibit greater investment knowledge, but that these effects are offset by the adverse effects of cognitive aging which further incentivizes early planning for women who may want to prepare not only for widowhood but also for the cognitive decline of their husbands. Future work will specifically consider the effects of cognitive decline. Since the model shows declining incentives to invest after widowhood, it sheds some light on the stylized fact that widows have very low levels of financial knowledge. The model can also be applied more generally to the expected duration of the union rather than the expected timing of widowhood, so the same implications can be drawn to women facing varying probabilities of divorce.

One extension not yet considered is the availability of an outside option for dealing with the shorter-living spouse's tasks. Instead of learning to manage her own wealth, she can have a third person, whether an adult child or a financial planner, manage her finances on her behalf. Indeed, the third-person option may be one reason why women do not appear to react to a longer expected duration of widowhood.

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A Proofs

Solving the Lagrangian in equation (7) yields the following first order conditions:

$$\beta^t u_{xt} = \lambda R_t \quad (12)$$

$$\beta^t u_{lt} = \lambda R_t w_t \quad (13)$$

$$\gamma_t \beta^t f'(I_t) = \lambda R_t w_t \quad (14)$$

$$g_{t+1} \left(\frac{\beta^{t+1} - \beta^{T+1}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+1}) + \gamma_{t+1} \beta^{t+1} (1 - \delta) = \beta^t \gamma_t \quad (15)$$

Start with (15) and divide through by β^t :

$$g_{t+1} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-t}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+1}) + \gamma_{t+1} \beta (1 - \delta) = \gamma_t$$

Solve forward for γ_t :

$$\begin{aligned} \gamma_t &= g_{t+1} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-t}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+1}) + \beta(1 - \delta) \left[g_{t+2} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-(t+1)}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+2}) + \gamma_{t+2} \beta (1 - \delta) \right] \\ \gamma_t &= \sum_{j=0}^T [\beta(1 - \delta)]^j g_{t+j+1} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-(t+j)}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+j+1}) \end{aligned}$$

Set (13) = (14), solve for γ , and replace the left side of the above equation with γ :

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{u_{lt}}{f'(I_t)} &= \sum_{j=0}^T [\beta(1 - \delta)]^j g_{t+j+1} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-(t+j)}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+j+1}) \\ u_{lt} &= f'(I_t) \sum_{j=0}^T [\beta(1 - \delta)]^j g_{t+j+1} \left(\frac{\beta - \beta^{T+1-(t+j)}}{1 - \beta} \right) v'(K_{t+j+1}) \end{aligned}$$

B Data appendix

B.1 Response rates

1,222 participants who completed the CogUSA study¹⁶ were invited to complete the Cognitive Economics Survey. The invitees included 371 uncoupled individuals, 304 couples in which both members were invited (608 individuals) and 243 couples in which only one member was invited.

The reasons for which these 243 partners were not invited:

- 48 only partially completed the CogUSA study
- 138 refused to participate in the CogUSA study
- 24 did not provide an interview for CogUSA for unspecified reasons
- 4 were removed from the CogUSA sample for unknown reasons
- 4 were not interviewed by CogUSA due to language problems
- 25 were physically or mentally unable to conduct the CogUSA telephone interview.

CogEcon had an overall response rate of 80.61 percent, yielding a sample size of 985 respondents. Response rates of mutually exhaustive sub groups:

- uncoupled individuals: $286/371 = 77.09\%$
- members of couples in which both members were invited: $512/608 = 84.21\%$
- individuals whose partners were not invited: $187/243 = 76.95\%$.

These response rates yielded the following CogEcon respondents:

- 286 uncoupled individuals
- 468 coupled individuals whose partners also completed CogEcon
- 44 coupled individuals who completed CogEcon but whose partners completed CogUSA only
- 187 coupled individuals who completed CogEcon but whose partners did not complete CogUSA.

Among the 304 couples with both members invited to CogEcon, there were 26 couples with no respondents, and 42 couples with one respondent (half of whom were male, half were female). The remaining couples provided one complete survey for each individual.

¹⁶The 2008 wave of the CogUSA study was conducted in two stages, a telephone interview, then a face-to-face interview. Of the 3224 contacted for the telephone interview, 1514 completed this interview, for a response rate of 47 percent that was on target for a Random Digit Dialing sample methodology. 1230 (81 percent) of telephone respondents completed a face-to-face interview. Respondents and non-respondents to the face-to-face interview were not statistically significantly different at the 5 percent level in terms of cognition (Serial 7s and Mental Status), age, sex, race, couple status, and self-rated health status. Respondents had, on average, .36 more years of education ($p < 0.2$).

Among the 851 invitees in couples, men responded at a rate that was about 2 percentage points higher than women, though the difference is not statistically significant.

All of the empirical results reported in this paper are estimated using unweighted data.

B.2 Derivation of the analysis sample

The Cognitive Economics survey is composed of 985 individuals in 751 households (including 286 singletons). To construct my sample, I drop the 286 singletons as well as those in same sex couples (3 couples in total). Doing so leaves 462 households, which are composed of

- 233 couples about which we have full information (cognition data from CogUSA and financial knowledge data from CogEcon),
- 21 couples for which we have full information about the wife and cognition data only about the husband,
- 21 couples for which we have full information about the husband and cognition data about the wife, and
- 187 couples with only one respondent with no information about the partner.

When the wife-husband difference in financial sophistication is used as the dependent variable, the maximum sample possible is the 224 couples from which both members completed at least part of the financial literacy battery in CogEcon in addition to CogUSA. The dependent variable here is constructed using CogEcon responses from both members of the couple. Due to item non-response for some variables, actual sample sizes will vary according to the specification used.

B.3 Survey questions used in the analysis

B.3.1 Financial literacy questions in CogEcon

The following tables list the question number and the text of both true and false versions of each financial literacy question on the Cognitive Economics survey, with the mean score on each question for women and men in the 224 couples in the sample. All of these questions have been fielded on the RAND American Life Panel (Delavande et al., 2008); sixteen of these questions were also fielded on the 2008 wave of the Health and Retirement Study (Lusardi et al., 2009b), and twelve are currently being fielded on the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study.

Questions related to stock

	Question text		Mean score	
	True Version	False Version	Women	Men
18	Financially, investing in the stock market is better than buying lottery tickets.	Financially, investing in the stock market is no better than buying lottery tickets.	0.82	0.90

19	When an investor spreads money between 20 stocks, rather than 2, the risk of losing a lot of money decreases.	When an investor spreads money between 20 stocks, rather than 2, the risk of losing a lot of money increases.	0.74	0.79
22	Mutual funds do not pay a guaranteed rate of return.	Mutual funds pay a guaranteed rate of return.	0.65	0.76
24	It is easy to find mutual funds that have annual fees of less than one percent of assets.	It is hard to find mutual funds that have annual fees of less than one percent of assets.	0.54	0.58
25	Even if you are smart, it is hard to pick individual company stocks that will have better than average returns.	If you are smart, it is easy to pick individual company stocks that will have better than average returns.	0.59	0.61
28	It is possible to invest in the stock market in a way that makes it hard for people to take unfair advantage of you.	There is no way to avoid people taking advantage of you if you try to invest in the stock market.	0.69	0.71
31	An employee of a company with publicly traded stock should have little or none of his or her retirement savings in the company's stock.	An employee of a company with publicly traded stock should have a lot of his or her retirement savings in the company's stock.	0.55	0.53
33	It is a good idea to own stocks of foreign companies.	It is best to avoid owning stocks of foreign companies.	0.61	0.68
34	Even older retired people should hold some stocks.	Older retired people should not hold any stocks.	0.76	0.80
35	You should invest in either mutual funds or a large number of different stocks instead of just a few stocks.	You should invest most of your money in a few good stocks that you select rather than in lots of stocks or in mutual funds.	0.69	0.72
36	To make money in the stock market, you should not buy and sell stocks too often.	To make money in the stock market, you have to buy and sell stocks often.	0.68	0.68
39	It is better for young people saving for retirement to combine stocks with long-term (inflation protected) bonds than with short-term (inflation protected) bonds.	It is better for young people saving for retirement to combine stocks with short-term (inflation protected) bonds than with long-term (inflation protected) bonds.	0.59	0.58

40	If you invest for the long run, the annual fees of mutual funds are important.	If you invest for the long run, the annual fees of mutual funds are unimportant.	0.68	0.73
41	Buying a stock mutual fund usually provides a safer return than a single company stock.	Buying a single company stock usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.	0.74	0.77

Questions not related to stock

	Question text		Mean score	
	True Version	False Version	Women	Men
17	An investment advisor tells a 30-year-old couple that \$1,000 in an investment that pays a certain, constant interest rate would double in value to \$2,000 after 20 years (by the time they are 50). If so, that investment would be worth \$4,000 after 40 years (by the time they are 70).	An investment advisor tells a 30-year-old couple that \$1,000 in an investment that pays a certain, constant interest rate would double in value to \$2,000 after 20 years (by the time they are 50). If so, that investment would not be worth \$4,000 for at least 45 years (until they are at least 75).	0.71	0.80
20	If you start out with \$1,000 and earn an average return of 10% per year for 30 years, after compounding, the initial \$1,000 will have grown to more than \$6,000.	If you start out with \$1,000 and earn an average return of 10% per year for 30 years, even after compounding, the initial \$1,000 will have grown to less than \$6,000.	0.58	0.71
21	The more you diversify among stocks, the more of your money you can invest in stocks.	The more you diversify among stocks, the less of your money you should invest in stocks.	0.59	0.61
23	Young people should hold somewhat riskier financial investments than older people.	Older people should hold somewhat riskier financial investments than young people.	0.78	0.80
26	Using money in a bank savings account to pay off credit card debt is usually a good idea.	Using money in a bank savings account to pay off credit card debt is usually a bad idea.	0.65	0.74
27	You could save money in interest costs by choosing a 15-year rather than a 30-year mortgage.	You could save money in interest costs by choosing a 30-year rather than a 15-year mortgage.	0.84	0.88
29	If the interest rate falls, bond prices will rise.	If the interest rate falls, bond prices will fall.	0.55	0.60

30	Taxes affect how you should invest your money.	Taxes do not affect how you should invest your money.	0.68	0.75
32	For a family with a working husband and a wife staying home to take care of their young children, life insurance that will replace three years of income is not enough life insurance.	For a family with a working husband and a wife staying home to take care of their young children, life insurance that will replace three years of income is more than enough.	0.78	0.74
38	It is important to take a look at your investments periodically to see if you need to make changes.	Once you have made an initial decision about the investment mix for your portfolio, you should avoid making changes to your portfolio until you are close to retirement.	0.85	0.84

B.3.2 Other measures of financial knowledge in CogEcon

Questions asked on the Cognitive Economics 2008 Survey (answer choices in parentheses):

Self-rated financial knowledge Question 12: I am good at dealing with day-to-day financial matters, such as checking accounts, credit cards, mortgages, installment payments, and budgeting. (Strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).

Self-rated stock knowledge Question 10: I understand the stock market reasonably well. (Strongly agree, agree, slightly agree, slightly disagree, disagree, strongly disagree).

Questions asked on the Cognitive Economics 2009 Survey (answer choices in parentheses):

Historical knowledge Question 89: On average *over the last 100 years*, how do you think the *annual rate of return on stocks* has compared to the *annual rate of return on bonds*? (Stock returns have been higher than bond returns, bond returns have been higher than stock returns, both returns were the same).

Following the stock market Question 82: How closely do you follow the stock market? (Very closely, somewhat, not at all).

B.4 Subjective survival probability in CogEcon

These survival questions were asked as part of the Cognitive Economics / CogUSA survey section on expectations. The questions are designed to elicit a respondent's belief about the likelihood that a future event will be realized.

At the beginning of this section, respondents are read the following:

Next we would like to ask your opinion about how likely you think various events might be. When I ask a question I'd like for you to give me a number from 0 to 100, where "0" means that you think there is absolutely no chance, and "100" means that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen.

For example, no one can ever be sure about tomorrow's weather, but if you think that rain is very unlikely tomorrow, you might say that there is a 10 percent chance of rain. If you think there is a very good chance that it will rain tomorrow, you might say that there is an 80 percent chance of rain.

The survey proceeds with questions eliciting the respondent's probabilistic expectations of future events. One set of questions asks about the respondent's survival probabilities. Respondents are asked "What is the percent chance that you will live to be X or more?" where X is the target age, determined according to the following table.

Age of respondent	Target age	Years to target age
<65	75 and 85	>10 and >20
65-69	80	11-15
70-74	85	11-15
75-79	90	11-15
80-84	95	11-15
85-89	100	11-15
≥ 90	none	n/a

These questions elicit the following: $\Pr(\text{alive at least 10-15 years from now} \mid \text{alive today})$.

The survival probability measure in the model is the sequence of g_{t+1} over the maximum length of life, where

$$g_{t+1} = \Pr(\text{husband dies right before } t+1) = \Pr(\text{husband lives exactly until } t).$$

This measure can be transformed as follows:

$S_t = \Pr(\text{husband is alive during time } t) = \sum_{j=t}^{\infty} g_{j+1}$. This is the "survivor function," or the probability that the duration equals or exceeds t

$h_{t+1} = \frac{S_t - S_{t+1}}{S_t} = \frac{g_{t+1}}{S_t}$. This is the hazard function, or the probability of dying during $t+1$ conditional on being alive during t

$d_{t+1} = 1 - h_{t+1} = \frac{g_{t+1}}{S_t}$. This is the probability of surviving at least to $t+1$ conditional on surviving to t .

Subjective survival questions in the survey speak to d_{t+1} . Those who are younger than 65 years are asked, "What is the percent chance that you will live to be 75 or more?" (P028), in which case t is defined as the current age and $t+1$ is defined as age 75.

C Equations for life table widowhood measures

Suppose that the current age of the wife is x and the age of the husband's age is y during the time of the survey.

Let l_d^f be the woman's life table probability of surviving from birth to age d and l_d^m the husband's life table probability of surviving from birth to age d . Let q_d^m be the life table probability that the husband dies at age d (this is the life table one-year mortality rate at age d).

The probability that the woman becomes a widow t years from the survey is the joint probability that woman is alive in t years, the man is alive in t years, and that the man dies at age $(y + t)$, conditional on the woman and her husband both being alive at ages x and y , respectively. This probability can be expressed as:

$$f(x, y, t) = \frac{l_{x+t}^f}{l_x^f} \frac{l_{y+t}^m}{l_y^m} q_{y+t}^m. \quad (16)$$

The probability that a woman will outlive her husband is therefore the sum of $f(x, y, t)$ over all possible years of the onset of widowhood:

$$Pr(\text{woman outlives her husband}) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} f(x, y, t). \quad (17)$$

The expected time to widowhood and the the expected duration of widowhood, conditional on a woman outliving her husband, is:

$$E[\text{Time to widowhood} | \text{woman outlives husband}] = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (t) f(x, y, t)}{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} f(x, y, t)} \quad (18)$$

$$E[\text{Length of widowhood} | \text{woman outlives husband}] = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} (e_{x+t}^f) f(x, y, t)}{\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} f(x, y, t)} \quad (19)$$

where e_{x+t}^f is the woman's remaining life expectancy at age $x + t$.

D Standard error adjustment for two-stage analysis

Because the regressions using the HRS predicted ten-year survival probabilities employ two-step estimation, the covariance matrix of the second step equation must be corrected. I will use the two-step maximum likelihood estimation described in in Murphy and Topel (1985).

This section employs the Greene's notation (Greene, 2002, page 510). From page 510:

Theorem 17.8: Asymptotic Distribution of the Two-Step MLE [Murphy and Topel (1985)] If the standard regularity conditions are met for both log-likelihood functions, then the second-step maximum likelihood estimator of θ_2 is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed with asymptotic covariance matrix

$$V_2^* = \frac{1}{n}(V_2 + V_2[CV_1C' - RV_1C' - CV_1R']V_2)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} V_1 &= Asy.Var[\sqrt{n}(\hat{\theta}_1 - \theta_1)] \text{ based on } \ln L_1 \\ V_2 &= Asy.Var[\sqrt{n}(\hat{\theta}_2 - \theta_2)]; \text{ based on } \ln L_2 \\ C &= E \left[\frac{1}{n} \frac{\partial \ln L_2}{\partial \hat{\theta}_2} \cdot \frac{\partial \ln L_2}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1^T} \right] \\ R &= E \left[\frac{1}{n} \frac{\partial \ln L_2}{\partial \hat{\theta}_2} \cdot \frac{\partial \ln L_1}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1^T} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

$\hat{V}_1$ and $\hat{V}_2$ are the uncorrected first and second stage variance matrices. The matrices required for correction are estimated as:

$$\hat{C} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_2} \cdot \frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1^T} \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{R} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_2} \cdot \frac{\partial \ln f_{i1}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1^T}. \quad (20)$$

As usual, n is the number of observations. The total number of second stage regressors is $m + k$ where k is the number of non-predicted second-step regressors, and m is the number of regressors generated by the first step. There are T first-stage regressors.

Since the parameters estimated in the two steps are based on different samples (HRS in the first step and CogEcon in the second), $\hat{R}$ is exactly zero (Murphy and Topel (1985), page 377).

Now, consider each derivative in the two matrices. In the first-step probit log likelihood

contribution of each person:

$$\ln f_{i1} = F(\theta_1, x_{1i}) = y_i \ln \Phi(x_i^T \theta_1) + (1 - y_i) \ln(1 - \ln \Phi(x_i^T \theta_1)) \quad (21)$$

$$\frac{\partial \ln f_{i1}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1} = \frac{\partial \ln f_{i1}}{\partial x_i \hat{\theta}} \cdot \frac{\partial x_i \hat{\theta}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1} = \text{stata score} * x_i. \quad (22)$$

Note that the score reported by STATA is first derivative of the log likelihood for the probit with respect to $x\beta$. The other derivatives are different for the linear regression second step and probit second step.

Linear regression second stage

For analysis of general financial knowledge within the household, I regress wife-husband difference in financial sophistication on husband's predicted survival, the wife-husband difference in predicted survival, and control variables. Therefore, the estimating equation is:

$$\text{Difference in finsoph} = x_2 \theta_2 + \gamma_1 \Phi(x_{1\text{husband}} \theta_1) + \gamma_2 (\Phi(x_{1\text{self}} \theta_1) - \Phi(x_{1\text{husb}} \theta_1))$$

where

$\frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \theta_2}$: $N \times (m + k)$ vector (one column for each 2nd stage regressor)

$$\begin{aligned} \ln f_{i2} &= \ln 1 - \ln(\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}) - \frac{1}{2} \cdot \left(\frac{y - X^T \theta_2}{\sigma} \right)^2 \\ \frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_2} &= \frac{(y_i - x_i^T \theta_2)}{\sigma^2} \cdot x_i^T \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

$\frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1^T}$: $N \times T$ vector (one column for each parameter predicting generated regressor). Let θ_2 related to generated regressors be $[\gamma_1, \gamma_2]$, for the husband's survival and difference in own and husband's survival, respectively.

$$\begin{aligned} \ln f_{i2} &= \ln 1 - \ln(\sqrt{2\pi\sigma^2}) - \frac{\{y_i - x_i^T \theta_2 - (\gamma_1 - \gamma_2) \Phi(x_{1\text{husb}} \theta) - \gamma_2 \Phi(x_{1\text{self}} \theta)\}^2}{2\sigma^2} \\ \frac{\partial \ln f_{i2}}{\partial \hat{\theta}_1} &= -2 \frac{\text{residual}}{2\sigma^2} \cdot [-(\gamma_1 - \gamma_2) \phi(x_{1\text{husb}} \theta) x_{1\text{husb}} - \gamma_2 \phi(x_{1\text{self}} \theta) x_{1\text{self}}] \end{aligned} \quad (24)$$

Lastly, I use STATA's degree of freedom adjusted variance matrix for the second step $\hat{V}_2$.

E Figures

Figure 1: Timeline of analysis

The initial division of labor breaks down at time D .

Figure 2: Present value of an additional unit of human capital at time t

The payoffs to financial human capital are realized for the woman when she is a widow, for $T - D$ years. While her husband is still alive, the value of a marginal increase in financial human capital is discounted by the number of years a woman must wait until the stream begins ($D - t$ years). At time zero, the present value of the benefits are low due to the D -year delay until widowhood. The value increases as a woman approaches widowhood, at which point it declines because of the decreasing number of years the knowledge can be used.

Figure 3: A financial literacy question on CogEcon

Q30	Taxes affect how you should invest your money.											
Most Likely False						Most Likely True						
Surely False			Guess False			Guess True			Surely True			
100%	90%	80%	70%	60%	50%	50%	60%	70%	80%	90%	100%	

➡ Please Circle One Number

Figure 4: Financial literacy and husband's age

OLS regression of the right panel is reported in Table 6.

Figure 5: Financial literacy (no stock questions) and husband's age

OLS regression of the right panel is reported in Table 6.

Figure 6: Cognitive measures (normalized) and husband's age

Unlike financial literacy, women's cognition scores do not systematically gain on their husband's scores. The cognition variables are detailed in Section 4.3.

Figure 7: U.S. historical age at first marriage

Figure 8: U.S. historical divorce rates

Vertical lines indicate the 5th and 95th percentile of year of first marriage among partnered respondents in the CogEcon sample. Younger women face greater incentives than older women to acquire financial literacy early in life.

Figure 9: Probability of ever being divorced for women in the CogEcon sample, by husband's age

Older women in the sample are less likely than younger women to have ever been divorced.

Figure 10: Individual and life table 10-year survival probabilities
Scatterplot

Solid and dashed plots represent life table survival probabilities. Scatterplots are generated using CogEcon respondents with partners.

F Tables

Table 1: Ratio of the marginal effect of time to widowhood and length of widowhood on the value of human capital

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
ratio with $\delta = 0.00$	1.52	0.15	1.21	2.23
ratio with $\delta = 0.03$	2.03	0.25	1.53	3.28
ratio with $\delta = 0.05$	2.38	0.33	1.663	4.00

If the depreciation of financial literacy is zero, the magnitude of the effect of time to widowhood on would be on average 1.52 times the magnitude of the effect of the duration. If human capital depreciates, the effect of time to widowhood is even greater relative to the effect of the duration.

Table 2: Demographic characteristics of the analysis sample

Variable	Women		Men		Diff.
	Mean	N	Mean	N	
Age	60.53 (9.44)	224	62.86 (10.04)	224	-2.326 ***
Life expectancy (years)	24.00 (7.47)	224	19.25 (6.91)	224	4.758 ***
Years of education	14.42 (1.99)	224	14.65 (2.16)	224	-0.228 *
Who is most knowledgeable about finances?					
Me	0.161 (0.367)	223	0.491 (0.501)	216	-0.321 ***
Me OR Both of us	0.489 (0.501)	223	0.866 (0.342)	216	-.372 ***

Standard deviations in parentheses.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Table 3: Summary of regression variables

Variable	Mean	SD	N
Outcomes			
Wife-husband diff. in normalized financial literacy	-0.37	1.10	224
Wife-husband diff. in fin. literacy (no stock questions)	-0.31	1.25	224
Key explanatory variables			
Expected time to widowhood (years)	14.39	5.74	224
Expected length of widowhood (years)	12.92	2.87	224
Other regressors			
Woman's risk tolerance (6 point scale)	2.36	1.39	214
Husband's self-rated health (5 point scale)	3.63	1.00	224
Woman's self-rated health (5 point scale)	3.73	0.96	224
Husband's years of education	14.65	2.16	224
Woman's years of education	14.42	1.99	224
Woman's Recall score (normalized)	0.40	0.85	224
Husband's Recall score (normalized)	-0.06	0.94	223
Woman's Number Series score (normalized)	0.17	0.84	224
Husband's Number Series score (normalized)	0.34	0.88	224

Table 4: Consistency of responses to “Who is most financially knowledgeable” within couples

Husband's response	Wife's response					Total
	Me	Partner	Both	Someone else	No Response	
Me	4	84	19	0	3	110
Partner	20	4	6	0	0	30
Both	15	20	47	1	0	83
Someone else	0	1	0	1	0	2
No response	0	5	3	0		8
Total	39	114	75	2	3	233

Only 10 couples (4%) report inconsistent answers about who is the household CFO, defined as the person who is most financially knowledgeable within the household.

Table 5: Comparative advantage and the division of labor: characteristics of couples by gender of CFOs

CFO	Wife-husband Differences in				N
	Age	Educ.	Normalized Number Series	Normalized Financial Literacy	
Wife	-1.33	.69	.13	.30	36
Husband	-2.60	-.62	-.44	-.71	112
Both	-2.40	-.12	.05	-.16	73
Someone else	-4	2.5	.91	.21	2
No Response	1	-3	.65	-2.10	1
Total	-2.33	-.23	-.17	-.37	224

The Household CFO is defined as the person who is most financially knowledgeable within the household. The CFO tends to be more educated, have more financial literacy, and have more fluid intelligence (as measured by the Number Series score) than his or her spouse; this is true for couples with male CFOs as well as those with female CFOs.

Table 6: Wife-husband difference in financial literacy and husband's age

	All q's	No stock q's
Husband's age	.013 (.007)*	.017 (.008)**
cons	-1.212 (.466)***	-1.379 (.526)***
N	224	224
R ²	.015	.019
F	3.37	4.237

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

These regressions are OLS versions of the graphs on the right panels of 4 and 5. As the husband ages, the woman gains financial literacy relative to her husband.

Table 7: Financial literacy regressions (all questions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Expected time to widowhood	-.041 (.02)**	-.037 (.02)*	-.035 (.02)*
Expected duration of widowhood	.043 (.04)	.042 (.04)	.037 (.04)
Woman's risk tolerance	.0008 (.054)		
Woman's health	.063 (.078)	.047 (.078)	
Husband's health	-.092 (.076)	-.082 (.075)	
Woman's education	.035 (.045)	.056 (.041)	
Husband's education	-.105 (.043)**	-.11 (.038)***	
Woman's Recall	-.028 (.091)		
Husband's Recall	-.042 (.09)		
Woman's Number Series	.321 (.109)***		
Husband's Number Series	-.197 (.099)**		
Const.	.754 (.894)	.533 (.739)	-.349 (.377)
N	213	224	224
R ²	.13	.061	.016
F	2.729	2.338	1.844

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

OLS regression with dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized financial sophistication score

Table 8: Financial literacy regressions (no stock questions)

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Expected time to widowhood	-.048 (.023)**	-.044 (.022)**	-.042 (.022)*
Expected duration of widowhood	.041 (.045)	.043 (.045)	.04 (.045)
Woman's risk tolerance	-.041 (.062)		
Woman's health	.044 (.088)	.032 (.088)	
Husband's health	-.037 (.086)	-.018 (.084)	
Woman's education	.039 (.051)	.08 (.046)*	
Husband's education	-.124 (.048)**	-.143 (.043)***	
Woman's Recall	.034 (.104)		
Husband's Recall	-.061 (.102)		
Woman's Number Series	.387 (.124)***		
Husband's Number Series	-.248 (.112)**		
Const.	1.134 (1.018)	.643 (.832)	-.231 (.426)
N	213	224	224
R ²	.144	.069	.019
F	3.065	2.668	2.161

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

OLS regression with dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized non-stock financial literacy score. This table reproduces the regressions in Table 7, replacing the dependent variable with a financial literacy score that excludes all stock questions. The coefficients are qualitatively the same, but the effect of the time to widowhood is larger in magnitude here.

Table 9: Falsification tests: regressions using cognition outcomes

	Fin Soph	Number Series	Calcu- lations	Verbal Analogies	Mental Status	Total Recall	Visual Matching
Time to widowhood	-.038 (.02)*	.001 (.018)	0.014 (.02)	-.016 (.018)	-.002 (.019)	-.038 (.021)*	-.009 (.02)
Duration of widowhood	.038 (.04)	-.012 (.036)	0.016 (.039)	.014 (.037)	.044 (.038)	.003 (.042)	.05 (.04)
Woman's risk tolerance	.019 (.054)	.055 (.048)	0.013 (.053)	-.041 (.05)	.094 (.052)*	.069 (.057)	.026 (.054)
Woman's health	.051 (.078)	.039 (.069)	0.189 (.077)**	-.032 (.072)	.118 (.074)	.097 (.082)	.101 (.077)
Husband's health	-.07 (.077)	.06 (.068)	-0.035 (.076)	.063 (.071)	-.038 (.073)	.027 (.08)	-.006 (.076)
Woman's education	.08 (.042)*	.169 (.037)***	0.13 (.041)***	.145 (.039)***	.069 (.04)*	.06 (.044)	.002 (.041)
Husband's education	-.128 (.039)***	-.137 (.035)***	-0.155 (.038)***	-.071 (.036)**	-.022 (.037)	-.124 (.041)***	-.058 (.038)
Const.	.387 (.757)	-.957 (.672)	-0.926 (.733)	-1.208 (.696)*	-1.858 (.717)***	1.307 (.788)*	.303 (.745)
N	214	214	213	214	213	213	214
R ²	.075	.121	0.121	.069	.063	.08	.031
F	2.384	4.042	4.024	2.196	1.968	2.534	.929

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

OLS regression with dependent variables: wife - husband difference in normalized cognition. These falsification tests reproduce the regression in column (1) of Table 7, replacing the dependent variable with the wife-husband difference in cognition scores and omitting the cognition scores (Number Series and Recall) on the right hand side. The cognition variables are detailed in Section 4.3. Because the cognition scores are normalized, the coefficients are directly comparable with those estimated using the wife-husband difference in financial literacy in column (1).

Table 10: Summary of husband's and wife-husband differences in 10-year survival probabilities

measure	variable	mean	sd	min	max	N
Life table	Husband	.72	.21	.10	.95	238
	Wife - husband	.11	.10	-.07	.65	238
Subjective - constant hazard	Husband	.71	.24	0	1	224
	Wife - husband	.05	.27	-.83	.77	214
HRS predicted probabilities	Husband	.87	.16	.21	.99	216
	Wife - husband	.08	.13	-.20	.62	215

Table 11: Cross-correlation table of alternate 10-year survival measures

Variables	Life Table	Subjective survival	HRS predicted
Life table	1.000		
Subjective survival	0.562	1.000	
HRS predicted	0.827	0.573	1.000

Table 12: Robustness check: Financial literacy regressions using 10-year survival measures

	Life table 10-year survival	Constant hazard life table	HRS predicted (adjusted se)
Husband's Pr(surv)	-0.664 (.594)	-0.634 (.454)	-0.328 (1.017)
Diff Pr(surv)	0.332 (1.151)	-0.38 (.382)	2.005 (1.187)*
Woman's risk tolerance	-0.005 (.054)	-0.012 (.058)	-0.015 (.053)
Woman's self-rated health	-0.063 (.078)	-0.075 (.084)	-0.015 (.081)
Husband's self-rated health	0.089 (.076)	0.094 (.085)	-0.031 (.083)
Woman's Education	0.037 (.045)	0.036 (.046)	0.052 (.045)
Husband's Education	-0.106 (.042)**	-0.107 (.044)**	-0.114 (.042)***
Woman's Recall Score	-0.022 (.091)	-0.016 (.097)	-0.05 (.091)
Husband's Recall Score	-0.032 (.09)	-0.062 (.093)	0.007 (.092)
Woman's Number Series	0.33 (.11)***	0.34 (.114)***	0.329 (.109)***
Husband's Number Series	-0.192 (.099)*	-0.186 (.105)*	-0.152 (.097)
cons	1.011 (.994)	1.07 (.893)	0.805 (1.332)
N	213	196	211
R ²	0.13	0.136	0.166
F	2.733	2.64	3.607

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized financial literacy scores, all questions.

Table 13: Robustness check: Financial literacy regressions (no stock questions) using 10-year survival measures

	Life table 10 year survival	Constant hazard Life table	HRS predicted
Husband's Pr(surv)	-1.083 (.678)	-0.767 (.521)	-1.012 (1.176)
Diff Pr(surv)	-.385 (1.313)	-.522 (.439)	1.208 (1.371)
Woman's risk tolerance	-.048 (.061)	-.062 (.066)	-.056 (.061)
Woman's health	.041 (.089)	.054 (.097)	.015 (.094)
Husband's health	-.036 (.086)	-.023 (.098)	.073 (.096)
Woman's education	.041 (.051)	.039 (.053)	.054 (.052)
Husband's education	-.125 (.048)***	-.12 (.051)**	-.13 (.048)***
Woman's Recall	.042 (.104)	.036 (.112)	.022 (.105)
Husband's Recall	-.052 (.103)	-.116 (.107)	-.011 (.106)
Woman's Number Series	.397 (.125)***	.409 (.131)***	.394 (.126)***
Husband's Number Series	-.24 (.113)**	-.252 (.121)**	-.21 (.112)*
Const.	1.809 (1.116)	1.433 (.944)	1.387 (1.392)
N	213	196	211
R ²	.142	0.152	.16
F	3.019	2.997	3.458

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Dependent variable: wife-husband difference in normalized financial literacy scores, excluding stock questions.

Table 14: Summary of other financial knowledge outcomes

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Woman's self-rated financial skills	5.03	0.99	1	6	238
Woman's self-rated stock market understanding	2.95	1.36	1	6	232
Wife-husband difference in self-rated financial skills	0.01	1.48	-4	5	217
Wife-husband difference in self-rated stock market understanding	-0.77	1.63	-5	5	210
Woman's correct response to "Stocks historically outperform bonds?"	0.57	0.50	0	1	187
Woman's "How closely do you follow the stock market?"	0.66	0.63	0	2	212

Full text of these questions are found in Appendix B.3. Self-rated financial skills and stock market understanding: coded as 6 for "strongly agree" and 1 for "strongly disagree." Historical stock/bond returns: coded as 1 if respondents correctly reported that stock returns have exceeded bond returns. Follow the stock market: coded as 2 for "very closely," 1 for "somewhat" and 0 for "not at all."

Table 15: Regressions of other financial knowledge outcomes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Woman's Financial skills	Woman's Stock market	Difference Financial skills	Difference Stock market	Stocks returns (AME)	Follow stock market
Expected time to widowhood	-.021 (.012)*	-.021 (.012)*	-.028 (.012)**	-.009 (.012)	-.012 (.005)**	-.041 (.014)***
Expected length of widowhood	-.043 (.022)**	.028 (.021)	-.031 (.021)	.03 (.022)	-.004 (.011)	-.028 (.025)
Woman's risk tolerance	.069 (.053)	.009 (.051)	.011 (.053)	-.031 (.054)	.007 (.025)	.019 (.062)
Woman's health	.142 (.077)*	.172 (.075)**	.019 (.076)	.113 (.076)	.026 (.037)	.161 (.091)*
Husband's health	-.13 (.077)*	-.052 (.073)	-.129 (.075)*	-.052 (.074)	-.035 (.035)	-.062 (.087)
Woman's education	-.066 (.043)	.023 (.041)	-.024 (.044)	.024 (.045)	-.032 (.021)	.016 (.047)
Husband's education	.018 (.042)	-.02 (.04)	-.051 (.042)	-.093 (.042)**	.055 (.02)***	-.101 (.049)**
Woman's Recall	.177 (.092)*	-.039 (.089)	.0002 (.09)	.118 (.091)	.063 (.045)	.036 (.106)
Husband's Recall	-.061 (.09)	.013 (.088)	-.098 (.089)	-.161 (.091)*	.069 (.044)	.343 (.108)***
Woman's Number Series	.186 (.11)*	.087 (.106)	.455 (.11)***	.217 (.108)**	.123 (.053)**	.171 (.13)
Husband's Number Series	.029 (.094)	.097 (.091)	-.124 (.096)	-.072 (.096)	-.05 (.044)	.235 (.109)**
N	238	232	217	210	187	212

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Dependent variables: woman's self-rated financial skills and stock market skills; wife-husband differences in self-ratings, woman's knowledge that stocks have historically outperformed bonds, woman's closely following the stock market.