### Systemic Risk and Regulation of the U.S. Insurance Industry

J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss NFI Summit March 20, 2013 Washington D.C. Risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in a substantial segment of the financial system that is serious enough to have significant adverse effects on the real economy with a high probability (Group of Ten, 2001)

#### **Criteria for Systemic Risk**

- Economic shocks become systemic because of spillover effects in which there is a contagious loss of value or confidence that spreads;
- Systemic financial events are serious enough to have significant adverse effects on real economic activity

Example: Bursting of housing price bubble

Are U.S. insurers systemically risky?
Core activities vs. Non-core
Statistical Analysis
Correlation and Regression Analyses
Regulatory responses to the financial crisis as relates to U.S. insurers

### Preview


- Core activities of P-C insurers not systemic
- Some activities of life insurers contribute to systemic risk
- In general, insurers are victims of systemic risk rather than instigators
- Non-core activities can be systemic
- On worldwide scale, better supervision of insurance groups needed

#### **Primary Factors for Systemic Risk: Core Activities**

Size
Insurers smaller than banks
\$7.1 trillion vs. \$12.6 trillion in banks

- > Insurance accounts for 3% of GDP
- Insurers hold 7.8% of credit market debt outstanding

#### **Equity Capital-to-Assets Ratios**



Source: Federal Reserve Flow of Funds accounts, American Council of Life Insurance, FDIC.

#### **Primary Factors for Systemic Risk: Core Activities**


#### Size (Continued)

- Low insolvency rate
- > Banks' failure rate in crisis vs insurers'
- Insurer resolutions are orderly
  - Need valid claim to receive cash
  - Some life insurer claims optionable

 Conclusion: Liquidation of assets at distressed prices does not occur nor are immediate settlements to all policyholders made at time of bankruptcy

#### Failure Rates: US Banks & Insurers

"Crisis hit banks much harder than insurers."




#### **Primary Factors for Systemic Risk: Core Activities**

#### Size (Cont'd)

- Insolvencies funded by guaranty funds
  - Assess insurers a small percent of premiums as claims arise for years into future
- Successful payment of some large insolvencies
- Annual assessment never exceeded 0.35% of premiums
- Conclusion: Guaranty fund system has stood up well, but has never been required to deal with widespread insolvency crisis

# **P/C Impairments: Triggering Events**




Deficient loss reserves, inadequate pricing, and rapid growth are the leading triggers. Investment catastrophe, and reinsurance losses play a much smaller role.

Source: A.M. Best: 1969-2010 Impairment Review, Special Report, May 2, 2011.

# **L-H Impairments: Triggering Events**


#### Life insurers more susceptible to affiliate problems.






#### Life/Health Insurer Impairments:1976-2010

Life/health impairments less cyclical than P/C




Source: A.M. Best, National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations.

#### Property-Casualty Insurance Guaranty Fund Assessments: 1978-2010



Source: A.M. Best Company, National Conference of Insurance Guaranty Funds.

#### Life-Health Insurance Guaranty Fund Assessments: 1988-2010



Source: A.M. Best, National Organization of Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Associations.

### Interconnectedness

- Refers to degree of correlation and potential for contagion among financial institutions and sectors
- Not a factor except perhaps for group annuities and separate accounts

#### **Primary Factors for Systemic Risk: Core Activities**

#### Interconnectedness (continuedd)

- Interconnectedness WITHIN insurance industry: Reinsurance
- Primary (or originating insurer) ultimately responsible for (reinsured) losses meaning counterparty credit risk
- In some cases, primary insurer reduces reported liabilities to extent reinsured
  - Life: 65.7% of surplus (non-affiliate)

97% of surplus (affiliate)

• P-C: 25.3% of surplus (non-affiliate)

14.9% of surplus (affiliate)

Conclusion: Reinsurance interconnectedness within industry high but not systemic

#### Lack of Substitutability

- Need lack of substitutability and critical functioning to economy to be systemic factor
- > Banks meet the above criteria
- Life insurance has many substitutes and easy entry of new capital historically
- P-C insurance not so many substitutes but ease of entry historically

## **Systemic Risk and Non-Core Activities**

#### Insurers expanded operations into banking activities since 1970s:

- > Privately placed bonds
- Deferred annuities
- Propriety mutual fund families
- Financial guarantees
- > Asset lending
- Securitization
- Investment in MBS and ABS

### Conclusion:

- Systemic risk from insurance not attributable to core activities
  - Exception possible with certain life products
- Interconnectedness between insurers and other financial firms more likely attributable to noncore or banking like activities, especially large, publicly traded firms.

### **Statistical Analysis and SRISK**

#### Measure of systemic: SRISK

- Expected capital shortfall of the firm in a financial crisis in millions of dollars
- Crisis defined as a situation where the broad market index declines by 40% over the next 6 months
- SRISK cannot distinguish between instigating a crisis or being susceptible to crisis

### **Correlations: SRISK & Selected Variables I**

Variable	Correlation	pvalue
<b>Company Characteristics</b>		
Ln(Assets)	0.5988	0.0000***
Capital/Assets	-0.0331	0.5676
Beta	0.4015	0.0000***
MBS/ Capital	-0.1229	0.1263
Total Premiums Ceded/ Capital	0.0205	0.7638
Total Reinsurance Liabilities/ Capital	0.1839	0.0043***
Separate Accounts Assets/ Total Assets	0.2081	0.0007***
Total Customer Deposits (Bank)/ Capital	0.4769	0.0000***
Commercial Paper/ Capital	0.3477	0.0000***
Life Insurer Dummy (=1 if Life Insurer)	-0.0327	0.5659
Life and P-C Insurer Business Dummy		
(=1 if both lines)	0.1191	0.0360**

### **Correlations: SRISK & Selected Variables II**

Variable	Correlation	pvalue
Lines of Business		
Workers Compensation Premiums/ Capital	-0.1407	0.0522*
Homeowners Multiple Peril Premiums/ Capital	-0.2144	0.0029***
Total Other Liability Premiums/ Capital	-0.2477	0.0005***
Private Passenger Automobile Liability		
Premiums/ Capital	-0.1929	0.0075***
Individual Life Insurance Premiums/ Capital	0.0125	0.8378
Ordinary Individual Annuity Premiums/ Capital	-0.0019	0.9751
Group Life Premiums/Capital	-0.0234	0.7018
Group Annuity Premiums/Capital	0.1259	0.0384**
Workers Compensation Prem/Total Premiums	-0.2867	0.0022***
Homeowners Multiple Peril Prem/Total Prem	-0.2878	0.0023***
Total Other Liability Prem/ Total Premiums	-0.2848	0.0021***

### **Correlations: SRISK & Selected Variables III**

Lines of Business (continued)	Correlation	pvalue
Private Passenger Auto Liability Prem/Total Prem	-0.3068	0.0010***
Individual Life Insurance Premiums/ Total Premiums	0.0400	0.6758
Ordinary Individual Annuity Premiums/ Total Prem	0.5178	0.0000***
Group Life Premiums/ Total Premiums	0.4189	0.0000***
Group Annuity Premiums/ Total Premiums	0.6675	0.0000***
Off Balance Sheet Activities		
Long Term Debt Due in One Year/Total Liabilities	0.3654	0.0000***
Total Fair Value of Derivatives/Capital Total Notional Value of Non-Hedge	0.5123	0.0000***
Derivatives/Capital	0.5427	0.0000***
Total Notional Amount of All Derivatives/ Capital	0.5226	0.0000***

### **Statistical Analysis and SRISK**

#### Bivariate Correlation Summary:

- > Insurer characteristics positively related to SRISK
  - Size
  - Market equity beta
  - Total reinsurance liabilities as % of capital
  - Commercial paper as % of liabilities
  - Separate accounts activity
  - Some life insurance product lines (e.g., group annuity)
  - Measures of off-balance-sheet activities
  - MBS as % of capital
- > P-C lines of business negatively related to SRISK
- > Reinsurance ceded as % of capital and leverage not significant

## **Regression 1: SRISK on Co Characteristics**

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistic
Ln(Asset)	0.3584	2.61**
Capital/ Asset	-1.0322	-0.68
Beta	0.6538	1.28
MBS/ Capital	0.5990	1.79*
Separate Account Assets/ Assets	2.2916	2.29**
Life Insurance Dummy (=1 if Life Insurer)	1.6844	2.40**
Life and P-C Insurer Dummy (=1 if both lines)	0.4182	1.01
Total Other Liability/ Capital	-2.0791	-0.84
Group Annuity Premiums/ Capital	2.4306	1.54
Total Reinsurance Liabilities/ Capital	1.8765	4.46***
Total Premiums Ceded/ Capital	-0.1349	-0.22
Constant	-6.0470	-2.57**
Adjusted R-squared	0.6042	

## **Regression 2: SRISK on Co Characteristics**

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistic
Ln(Asset)	0.3649	3.31***
Capital/ Asset	0.2751	0.22
Beta	0.6643	1.30
MBS/ Capital	0.5493	2.74**
Separate Account Assets/ Assets	2.7700	3.12***
Life Insurance Dummy (=1 if Life Insurer)	0.8668	0.98
Life and P-C Insurer Dummy (=1 if both lines)	0.4008	1.01
Total Other Liab. Premiums/Total Premiums	-0.3186	-0.25
Group Annuity Premiums/Total Premiums	5.4150	2.70***
Total Reinsurance Liabilities/ Capital	1.1456	2.07**
Total Premiums Ceded/ Capital	0.6390	1.14
Constant	-5.9180	-2.77***
Adjusted R-squared	0.6345	

### **Statistical Analysis and SRISK**

#### Regression Analysis Summary:

- Smaller set of observations and variables
- Positively and significantly related to SRISK:
  - MBS activity
  - Size
  - Total reinsurance liabilities (assumed business)
  - Group annuity variable
- Not significantly related to SRISK:
  - P-C liability line of business
  - Leverage
  - Reinsurance premiums ceded

- Historically, regulatory focus on legal entity
- Two Model Laws (ML) relate to insurance holding companies:
  - ML 440 Insurance Holding Company System Regulatory Act
  - ML 450 Insurance Holding Company System Model Regulation with Reporting Forms and Instructions

- Revisions to ML 440 and 450 adopted in 9 states
- Focus of proposed revisions:
  - > Enterprise risk management
  - > Corporate governance
  - Increasing regulatory authority to obtain information and regulate activities of insurance holding companies

- Risk Management and Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) Model Act
- Purpose:
  - Provide requirements for maintaining a risk management framework
  - To provide instructions for filing an ORSA Summary Report with insurance commissioner
- ORSA requirement applies to insurer or insurance group
- Goal:
  - > To foster an effective level of ERM for all insurers
  - > To provide a group level view of risk management and capital

Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)

- Stage process for designating a nonbank holding company as a SIFI
- Institutions designated SIFI come under regulatory purview of Federal Reserve which can impose:
  - "enhanced supervision and prudential standards, whether they are banks or nonbanks, and the ability to subject key market infrastructure firms to heightened risk management standards."
- "In 2011, 26 U.S. life insurance groups and 5 P-C groups exceeded stage I threshold of \$50 billion in assets

#### **Issues for Future Regulation**

- Key to effective insurance regulation is to design a regulatory system that effectively encompasses both the core and non-core enterprises of the insurance sector and coordinate regulation across countries.
  - More disclosure on derivatives, asset lending, and other non-core activities of insurers
  - Large insurers need consolidated state or federal supervisor
  - Focused (not blanket) approach
  - Consistent with IAIS standards
  - Global accounting system needed

## Conclusion

- Core activities of insurers, especially P-C insurers, not systemically risky
- Evidence that some core activities of life insurers associated with systemic risk
- Susceptibility not same as propagation
- Life and P-C insurers potentially vulnerable to reinsurance crises
- Non-core activities of insurers such as providing financial guarantees can be systemic
- Most non-core activities beyond traditional purview of insurance and banking regulators

### **Further Information**

- American International Group, 2009, AIG: Is the Risk Systemic? Powerpoint presentation (New York).
- De Bandt, Olivier and Philipp Hartmann, 2000, *Systemic Risk: A Survey* (Frankfurt, Germany: European Central Bank).
- Geneva Association, 2010, Systemic Risk in Insurance: An Analysis of Insurance and Financial Stability (Geneva, Switzerland).
- Group of 10, 2001, Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector
- Harrington, Scott E., 2009, "The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation," *Journal of Risk and Insurance* 76: 785-819.
- Kaufman, George G., 1996, "Bank Failures, Systemic Risk, and Bank Regulation," *The CATO Journal* 16: 17-45.
- Kaufman, George G., 2000, "Banking and Currency Crises and Systemic Risk: Lessons from Recent Events," *Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives* 24: 9-28.
- Swiss Re, 2003, *Reinsurance A Systemic Risk, Sigma No. 5/2003* (Zurich, Switzerland).
- World Economic Forum, 2009, *Global Risks 2009* (Geneva, Switzerland).
- Cummins, J. David and Mary A. Weiss, 2012, "Systemic Risk and the U.S. Insurance Sector," working paper, Temple University, Philadelphia.